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Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**I. Introduction**

1. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2296 (2016), the Secretary-General recommended in his letter dated 28 October 2016 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/915) that a joint African Union-United Nations strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) should be undertaken, in close consultation with the Government of the Sudan, to provide detailed recommendations to the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council on the mission's priorities and configuration and that, if necessary, further revision of the benchmarks to reflect the realities in Darfur be proposed. It was recommended that the review be undertaken in December 2016 and that the recommendations be submitted to both Councils in January 2017. The previous review of UNAMID was conducted in December 2013 (see S/2014/138).

2. A joint African Union-United Nations strategic review team visited Khartoum and Darfur from 5 to 17 March 2017. It was co-led by the African Union Liaison Office in the Sudan and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and comprised representatives from the African Union Commission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, representing United Nations development and humanitarian agencies, funds and programmes, respectively. The strategic review team held consultations with government officials and the United Nations country team, visited all five Darfur states and a number of team sites and met state and local authorities, representatives of the communities of internally displaced persons, the native administration and civil society groups.

3. The report provides a conflict analysis that depicts the current conflict dynamics and drivers in Darfur, as well as the political and humanitarian situation. In the report, the strategic priorities of UNAMID are examined, and a refocusing of the priorities in accordance with the conflict analysis is proposed. The report concludes with recommendations for the reconfiguration of UNAMID that seek to



adapt the mission to the evolving realities on the ground and to the needs of the people in Darfur.

II. Conflict analysis

4. Over the past three years, the armed conflict that gave rise to the deployment of UNAMID has altered in the light of the military successes of the Government of the Sudan against the rebel movements. Simultaneously, alongside the national dialogue launched in October 2015, the political framework agreement for the resolution of the conflict, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, has been included in the Constitution. However, key provisions have yet to be implemented, and a number of outstanding issues related to the aftermath of the conflict and crucial grievances at the origin of the rebellion still need to be addressed.

A. Conflict dynamics

Fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups and its impact on security

5. The hostilities between the Government of the Sudan and rebel forces have decreased significantly as a result of the three-phased Operation Decisive Summer (from January 2014 to June 2016), which effectively reduced the presence of the armed groups to parts of western Jebel Marra. According to UNAMID, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were considerably weakened and have not engaged militarily with the Sudanese Armed Forces since April 2014 and April 2015, respectively. They are currently reported to not have any active presence in Darfur or the Sudan.

6. While the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) continues to be present in Darfur, UNAMID considers its military effectiveness and area of operation to be considerably reduced. Since September 2016, there has been no military confrontation between the government forces and SLA/AW, and dry season combat (from late December to April), otherwise an annual occurrence, did not take place in 2017. The national armed forces currently maintain control of most areas and have deployed troops to Golo, Koron, Sarong and Guldo, while the following areas reportedly remain contentious under SLA/AW control: Kilinge, Boullay, Kibli, Bar Arie, Kalokitting, Kwila and Galol. Furthermore, SLA/AW is reported to have fragmented into an incohesive force of several factions, especially after a splinter group signed the "Koron agreement" with the Government on 4 November 2016, and even more so after the defection of its Deputy Commander, Alsadig Adam Abdulkarim, on 21 January 2017 and, more recently, the defection of a third faction led by Commander Abdel-Latif Abdel-Hamid on 14 April 2017.

7. In the meantime, however, conflicts in the wider region surrounding the Sudan are providing an opportunity for some of the Darfur armed groups to train and acquire military equipment and funds. The Panel of Experts on the Sudan has reported on the engagement of SLA/MM in Libya, fighting alongside the Libyan National Army in the area of the oil crescent since mid-2015, and in criminal activities, such as the operation of illegal checkpoints, kidnapping for ransom and trafficking in persons (S/2017/22). In an effort to prevent the infiltration of the Darfur armed groups from Libya, the Government of the Sudan has deployed the Rapid Support Forces along the northern borders of the region. A joint Libya-Sudan border force established in November 2013, following a military protocol signed in 2011, and mandated to protect their joint border, prevent the infiltration of armed elements, terrorist groups and illegal immigrants and secure the commercial

convoys was discontinued in 2015 by the internationally recognized Government of Libya, owing reportedly to other security priorities.

8. Reports also indicate the presence of JEM in Libya and South Sudan. As with SLA/MM, the group was reportedly fighting alongside the Libyan National Army, initially in the Qufrah area. In South Sudan, JEM is reported to have had a continuous presence since 2012 and has been engaged in fighting alongside the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in various areas of the country. Most recently, the group was witnessed fighting on the side of SPLA against Fertit militia and SPLA in Opposition in Raja and Wau as late as June-July 2016. The Sudan-South Sudan Safe Demilitarized Border Zone is monitored by the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission, as stipulated in the 2012 Agreement on Security Arrangements, and is supported by the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

9. The joint Chad-Sudan border monitoring force, established in 2010 with the objective of preventing cross-border attacks by rebel groups on both sides, continued to contribute visibly to stability in the western border areas. Discussions are ongoing regarding similar arrangements to cover the Darfur-Chad-Central African Republic triangle. Although the Central African Republic expressed its intention to join the Chad-Sudan force, to date this has not materialized owing to capacity constraints and continued political instability in the country. In September 2016, the Presidents of the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan held a meeting in Khartoum to discuss the deployment of joint border monitoring units.

Militia groups and proliferation of weapons

10. While the Government's military campaign and efforts to improve security in the Darfur state capitals have had a visible effect on the security front, the overall security situation in Darfur remains precarious. This is due mainly to the activities of the militia groups, the prevalence of weapons among the population and acts of banditry and criminality, coupled with the absence of an efficient police force and the rule of law.

11. Armed militias constitute one of the most complex issues in the security landscape of present-day Darfur. Organized mostly along tribal lines, armed militias have been present historically in Darfur as a protection arm of the communities in the face of fierce competition for scarce natural resources and acts of criminality, including cattle rustling. However, they gained notoriety as a result of their involvement in the recent Darfur conflict with the Janjaweed in support of the Sudanese government forces to quell the insurgency that started in 2003.

12. As the conflict evolved, some militias were incorporated into different auxiliary units of the Sudanese government forces, such as the Border Guards, the Popular Defence Forces, the Central Reserve Police and the Rapid Support Forces. Those auxiliary forces have since become key actors in the conflict between the Government and the armed movements and in intercommunal conflict, greatly influencing conflict dynamics in Darfur. Adequately equipped with small arms and heavy weapons, some of those forces are not only fighting against the rebel movements but, sometimes, also with each other or against government forces, further exacerbating insecurity and threats against civilians in Darfur.

13. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur stipulates that "all armed militia groups shall be disarmed and disbanded as a prerequisite for the implementation of comprehensive arms control measures" (art. 67, para. 399) and that the Government of the Sudan "shall be responsible for [their] disarmament" (ibid.). However, in practice, alternative approaches have been adopted: at the national level, some 30,000 members of the Rapid Support Forces were absorbed into the national armed

forces following the adoption of a parliamentary bill on 16 January 2017; at the community level, the review team was informed that Darfur state governments were exploring models of local agreements between the tribes of the area, such as the Shattay-Kailak model in South Darfur, where, according to government sources, some 600 farms were returned to their former owners, or the Amnounou model, whereby the state government was mediating between the militia groups and internally displaced persons the latter's return to their lands.

14. It is widely considered that the prevalence of weapons among the population is seriously contributing to large-scale violence, including intercommunal violence, and criminality and is undermining the establishment of the rule of law. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur provides only for "a voluntary civilian arms control programme" (art. 71, para. 416) and for the disarmament of former combatants (ibid., para. 432). The Darfur Disarmament High Committee was established by presidential decree on 2 April 2016, and the Government is currently designing a phased civilian arms control plan, which includes: (a) awareness-raising; (b) arms registration and marking; (c) voluntary surrender of arms; and (d) mandatory disarmament. While a pilot project on arms registration and marking was conducted in 2016, the initial results remain to be assessed. For such a programme to be successful, the Government of the Sudan should be in the lead, and the programme should include: (a) simultaneous collection of arms in the five Darfur states and in neighbouring Kordofan and Blue Nile; (b) a regional approach that includes neighbouring countries, such as the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya and South Sudan; and (c) economic compensation for the communities. In the Doha Document (ibid., paras. 416-417), the support of UNDP and UNAMID is requested in developing a strategy and plans for the implementation of a voluntary civilian arms control programme.

15. Throughout Darfur, former battlefields remain contaminated with explosive remnants of war. In Jebel Marra, initial assessments have indicated a large volume of explosive remnants of war requiring wide-scale mine action interventions. The National Mine Action Centre still lacks the capacity to undertake comprehensive mine action activities other than coordination. Furthermore, currently no capacity or resources exist within the international community to provide support for clearance of explosive remnants of war in Darfur.

Intercommunal conflicts

16. Intercommunal conflicts remain one of the main sources of violence in Darfur. Such conflicts are intimately related to the root causes of the conflict and exacerbated by armed militias, as well as by the proliferation of weapons among the civilians and the inadequate capacity and effectiveness of the rule of law institutions. While conflicts among the myriad ethnic groups of Darfur have historically occurred, the upsurge of violence during the insurgency years resulted in massive civilian casualties and population displacement. Management of land, water and other resources and a perceived bias by the Government towards one group over another are at the heart of those conflicts, which in 2013 claimed the lives of as many as 1,976 people. Following a concerted intervention by state governments, the national armed forces and the police from mid-2015 onward, the number of casualties has fallen and mediation efforts, supported by UNAMID, have multiplied, resulting in a significant decrease in intercommunal conflicts. However, conflicts continue to flare up in East Darfur between the Rizeigat and the Ma'aliya over land ownership and access to resources, in South Darfur between the Fallata, Salamat, Habbaniya and Masalit over access to farmland, grazing pastures and cattle rustling, and in Central Darfur between the Misseriya and Salamat over access to land and cattle rustling.

17. Land continues to be the most contested resource at the heart of most intercommunal conflicts in Darfur. Lack of clear land ownership and management systems, due to historical factors and government interventions on behalf of different tribal groups that have not addressed the issue in a comprehensive manner, have exacerbated and politicized such conflicts. The Unregistered Lands Act of 1970, followed by severe desertification in the 1980s, in tandem with the weakening of the native administration, the traditional administrative authority on land issues, and the ethnicization of the Darfur conflict since 2003 by the Government along the "Arab-African" narrative, with the open support of militia groups and extortion practices in their favour, resulted mainly in the Fur and Masalit tribes losing their fertile areas to several Arab tribes. Acknowledging the political dimension of land ownership and management, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur provided for the establishment of a land commission and a land database within the framework of the Darfur Regional Authority. The Land Commission was mandated to develop recommendations and a plan of land use for adoption by state legislatures and to serve as an arbitration forum on land rights disputes. Those tasks have yet to be completed.

B. Political developments

18. The Darfur peace process, led by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and supported by UNAMID, achieved measured progress with the signature of the Panel-proposed Road Map Agreement in March 2016 by the Government and in August by two out of the three remaining Darfur rebel movements. The parties have yet to sign the cessation of hostilities agreement, although the Government, SLA/MM and JEM/Gibril have declared unilateral ceasefires until June 2017, the main disagreement being the role of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in future talks. The Government insists that the Doha Document constitutes the sole framework for discussion, while the armed movements are calling for its renegotiation. In addition, the Government questions the purpose and practical value of a cessation of hostilities with armed groups that are currently believed to have no active presence or military capacities in Darfur or the Sudan. Nevertheless, the Government has expressed its readiness to engage in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the rebel movements, provided that they come to the borders of the Sudan.

19. Meanwhile, SLA/AW has rejected any participation in direct negotiations with the Government of the Sudan and called for the overthrow of the Government. As indicated above, three breakaway factions from SLA/AW have signed agreements with the Government since November 2016, allowing their members to either be integrated into the security forces or be demobilized under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. UNAMID support in this area has led to the demobilization of 9,766 combatants since 2009.

20. Following the conduct of the Darfur administrative referendum in April 2016, the Government proclaimed the end of the conflict, thus effectively legitimizing the administrative division of Darfur into five states, and dissolved the Darfur Regional Authority. The Darfur Peace Follow-up Office was consequently established in January 2017 to supervise the five residual commissions of the former Authority and one residual fund, namely the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, the Land Commission, the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, the newly established Commission for the Development of Pastoralists and Nomads and the Reconstruction and Development Fund.

21. One year after being formally launched as a means of achieving consensus on constitutional reform in the Sudan, the national dialogue process concluded in Khartoum on 10 October 2016 with the adoption of a national document. The document contains 981 recommendations, which are expected to form the basis for the drafting of a new Constitution, provides for a federal and presidential system of government, a two-chamber parliament and separation of the three branches of government and endorses the principles of democracy and the concept of equal citizenship and a diverse Sudanese identity. Further to the conclusion of the process, the Government has moved forward with the document's implementation, including the appointment of the First Vice-President, Bakri Hassan Saleh, to the position of Prime Minister on 1 March 2017 in preparation for the formation of a national unity Government. Major opposition groups in the Sudan, including the Sudan Call umbrella, boycotted the national dialogue and criticized the process for being conducted in an adverse political and human rights climate, instead calling for a pre-dialogue meeting in accordance with the Road Map Agreement. While standing firm in its view that the national dialogue has been concluded, the Government has expressed openness to the opposition groups contributing to discussions on the modalities of implementing the recommendations agreed upon in the national document.

22. In the wider region, the participation of the Sudan in the coalition against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, its agreement with the European Union to stem illegal migration to Europe, and achievements on the political and military fronts in Darfur improved the Government's political standing in the international arena and provided recovery prospects (albeit limited) for its economy. In that context, considerations of mutual benefit on security (by cutting support to the Darfur armed groups in particular) and in economic areas drove an improvement in its relations with Uganda in 2015, following a similar rapprochement with Chad since 2010, as well as with South Sudan to a limited extent. In January 2017, the Government of the United States of America announced a temporary and partial revocation of bilateral sanctions against the Sudan based on progress made along five tracks, including maintaining the cessation of hostilities in conflict areas, improving humanitarian access, ending negative interference in South Sudan, enhancing cooperation on counter-terrorism and addressing the threat of the Lord's Resistance Army. Following the revocation, which was scheduled to be reviewed in July 2017, the Government extended its unilateral cessation of hostilities in Darfur and the Two Areas for another six months and eased access restrictions on UNAMID and humanitarian actors.

C. Humanitarian and protection challenges

Communities of internally displaced persons

23. Notwithstanding improvements in security in recent months, as a result of the Darfur crisis, now in its fifteenth year, a total of 2.7 million people are currently displaced in Darfur, of whom 2.1 million are in need of humanitarian assistance, including 1.6 million in 60 camps. New displacement in 2016 was limited to the Jebel Marra area, where armed conflict triggered the displacement of more than 140,000 people. An additional 40,000 displaced in 2016 subsequently returned to their places of origin. Thousands more were reported to have been displaced, but this could not be verified owing to access constraints, even though since December 2016 the United Nations and its partners had been given access to previously inaccessible areas in order to carry out needs assessments and provide humanitarian assistance. No new displacement occurred in the first quarter of 2017. In addition,

more than 300,000 Sudanese refugees are located in neighbouring Chad, while about 121,000 South Sudanese are currently in Darfur.

24. Internally displaced persons continue to face grave security challenges. There are reports of internally displaced persons being killed, raped or harassed as they conduct life-sustaining activities outside the camps. Government security forces and armed militias are often involved, and in some camps, such as Kalma (South Darfur), tensions with the community of internally displaced persons are persistent. Furthermore, large-scale displacement has exacerbated communal tensions, as in the case of Sortony, North Darfur.

Protective environment

25. The review found that civilians continued to face serious protection issues despite some improvements over the past several years. In 2016, UNAMID documented 535 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 1,428 victims, an increase of 281 cases with a corresponding increase of 271 victims compared with 2015. Of the 535 documented cases in 2016, 130 cases involving 399 victims were attributed to government security entities, with the remaining 405 cases involving 1,029 victims attributed to armed militias and other groups. In the first three months of 2017, UNAMID documented 133 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 255 victims, of which 22 cases involving 32 victims were attributed to government security entities. This constitutes an increase in comparison to the same period in 2016.

26. Conflict-related sexual violence persists. In 2016, 100 such cases affecting 222 victims, comprising 102 women, 119 girls and 1 boy, were recorded. Internally displaced women are identified as being particularly at risk of conflict-related sexual violence. Such cases are usually underreported owing to stigma, fear of reprisals, weak institutions and the government-imposed restrictions on access to sites where incidents of mass rape have been reported in recent years.

27. Children continue to be particularly affected by the hostilities. In 2016, some 231 grave violations against children affecting 320 children were documented by the United Nations. Killing and maiming accounted for 109 incidents affecting 199 children (85 killed and 114 maimed). Some 20 schools were reportedly attacked, looted or destroyed by government forces and armed militias, specifically in the course of aerial bombardments in Jebel Marra.

Challenges in the area of rule of law

28. Across Darfur, the presence and capacity of justice and corrections institutions is limited. Notwithstanding the Government's efforts to restore the presence of criminal justice chain institutions in the main cities, rural areas are severely affected by their absence, which increases in particular the vulnerability of internally displaced persons. Established in 2012 to address serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law since 2003, the Special Court for Darfur Crimes remains largely ineffective owing to a perceived lack of political will and financial constraints. While limited progress has been made by the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur in prosecuting ex-combatants of armed movements and cases of sexual violence through the regular court system, impunity for serious crimes remains widespread. Furthermore, despite UNAMID support for the reopening and strengthening of rural courts, which deal with land disputes and other potential conflict drivers, their presence remains limited.

29. The Sudanese police have re-established their presence in most of the localities in Darfur, compared with previous years. Approximately 13,000 officers, 4.7 per cent of whom are women, are deployed in 74 police stations and 54

substations across Darfur. Challenges related to the inability to fully cover all the localities, rural areas and camps for internally displaced persons, lack of skills and mobility, and competition for resources, infrastructure and communication affect their ability to effectively undertake their primary responsibility to protect the communities.

III. Strategic priorities and mandate implementation

A. Peace process

30. In the context of its prioritization of “an inclusive peace process”, the mission provides support to the mediation led by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and to the parties in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, with specific focus on the former Darfur Regional Authority and the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process. The African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur continues to engage the parties on the way forward, in particular the armed movements, with a view to defining their position on the Doha Document. To date, the Darfur peace process has been hampered by the lack of constructive engagement on the part of the leaders of the remaining armed movements, whose presence and representativeness have been diminished. Their continued rejection of the Doha Document leaves the mediation little room for manoeuvre.

31. Within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the mission has focused, first, on the implementation of all outstanding provisions of the Doha Document and, second, on the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process. As a member of the Implementation Follow-up Commission, which monitors and assesses the implementation of the Doha Document, the Joint Special Representative regularly reports on its progress. The mission, through its civil affairs, rule of law and protection of civilians components, is working with the residual commissions of the former Darfur Regional Authority with a focus on the issues of land, reconciliation, transitional justice and returns. As those commissions are currently part of the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office under the presidency, the mission will need to reinforce its engagement with the central Government in Khartoum while working closely with the state-level authorities in Darfur in coordination with the United Nations country team.

32. The implementation of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation, which was foreseen as a “popular consultation and dialogue ... to consolidate peace in Darfur” (art. 76, para. 473), has been significantly delayed owing to serious funding constraints. Originally envisaged to take place within 120 days of the signing of the Doha Document, the process is complete in 64 Darfur localities, with the process expected to be completed in another 10 localities in its current third phase, with the facilitation of UNAMID. Despite contributions from the Governments of Qatar and the Sudan and the European Union, an estimated \$1.4 million is still required to finalize the process. To date, participants from all five Darfur states have raised such issues as insecurity, proliferation of weapons, land management, governance and strengthening of state authority, voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and reconciliation. As the consultation process is about to conclude, ways to channel its findings into processes related to the implementation of the national document and the constitutional reform process should be explored.

B. Protection of civilians

Protection of internally displaced persons

33. UNAMID has developed a series of important protection tools, including a mission-wide protection of civilians strategy. A robust protection coordination mechanism has been established at the headquarters and sector levels with the United Nations country team, and at the field level, integrated field protection teams have been established in team sites to provide early warning and enable swift responses. Protection matrices identifying threats to civilians are regularly updated in each state. A remaining key challenge for the mission's efforts on protection is securing unfettered access to Jebel Marra.

34. The military component, through its protection of civilians patrols, patrols in support of livelihood activities, including firewood, water and grass collection, and escorts and logistical support for humanitarian agencies, plays an important role in providing physical protection and facilitating humanitarian assistance. The military currently conduct on average more than 250 daily protection of civilians patrols and more than 20 weekly humanitarian escorts. They also provide protection to UNAMID personnel and property. UNAMID police (formed police units and individual police officers), currently deployed across Darfur, are part of the integrated field protection teams and support escorts of United Nations agencies and support the creation of a protective environment through the implementation of their community-oriented policing strategy.

35. UNAMID, in coordination with humanitarian United Nations agencies and partners, conducted a mapping of the settlements of internally displaced persons in Darfur with the objective of defining its protection priorities, in line with Security Council resolution 2296 (2016) and Peace and Security Council communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(DCV). The 2.7 million internally displaced persons in Darfur are spread over 174 settlements, including 60 camps, which host 63 per cent of that population, equivalent to 1.6 million people, while another 25 per cent live within host communities. The assessment of risks with regard to the protection of internally displaced persons concluded that 29 per cent of the settlements fell into the "very serious" and "serious" categories, the majority of them being camps for internally displaced persons. It was also observed that internally displaced persons were most vulnerable to incidents in areas of livelihood activities, such as farming and firewood or grass collection, and in seasonal return areas, as well as at the main transport arteries or roads to/from markets. On the basis of that analysis, UNAMID will focus its efforts on reducing threat levels in high-risk locations, supporting the voluntary return of internally displaced persons where appropriate, providing rapid response to prevent new displacement and protecting those fleeing from violence in contingency situations, particularly in Jebel Marra.

36. Any durable solutions for internally displaced persons should take into account the following: first, almost one third of the Darfur population is currently displaced; second, camps for internally displaced persons have become a location of services and accumulation of relative wealth, which not only risks developing an inclination for dependence for the internally displaced persons but also makes them an easy target for outside groups; third, a major process of de facto urbanization is taking place across Darfur, especially in areas with a large concentration of internally displaced persons around existing towns, which has set in motion new dynamics affecting durable solutions; and fourth, there are indications that a number of camps serve as shelter to armed movements, with weapons prevalent. Overall, it is of paramount importance that durable solutions for internally displaced persons be voluntary and in accordance with international standards.

Human rights

37. The mission has implemented its human rights mandate through monitoring, investigation and reporting, with a particular focus on vulnerable groups, advocacy and dialogue, and institution- and capacity-building activities. The work of the mission in this regard has been hampered by challenges that include a lack of access to victims, fears of reprisals and stigma among them and a lack of cooperation from government institutions (including in the issuance of visas for international staff). Furthermore, despite the support of UNAMID for the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Sudan National Human Rights Commission and the Special Court for Darfur Crimes, as provided for under the Doha Document, these mechanisms have faced considerable operational challenges in the lack of political will from the signatories and of resources. Further work is clearly required. OHCHR technical support for these mechanisms to discharge their mandates in line with international human rights standards is critical.

Rule of law

38. UNAMID has focused its justice and corrections interventions on: (a) supporting the re-establishment of the criminal justice chain in areas to which displaced persons return; (b) strengthening the capacity of rural courts to address land disputes and other intercommunal conflict drivers; (c) promoting the implementation of the Doha Document through support for the Special Court and the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur.

39. The Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur (2016-2019) was signed on 22 November 2016, bringing together relevant sections of UNAMID (rule of law, police, human rights, gender) and 10 United Nations agencies. The Programme reflects and complements the mission's mandated rule of law priorities and offers a framework for the United Nations country team, in particular UNDP, to take on many of the activities discontinued by UNAMID. So far, only 10 per cent of the overall budget of \$17 million is funded.

40. Through its Ordnance Disposal Office, UNAMID conducts survey and clearance of explosive remnants of war and provides education on explosive remnants of war for local communities at risk and technical advice and support to the National Mine Action Centre. Past activities include assistance to victims of incidents from explosive remnants of war and technical advice to the police and the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission on international best practices and guidelines in the safe storage of arms and ammunition.

41. In support of the implementation of the Doha Document, UNAMID provides technical and logistical assistance to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission for the demobilization (including reinsertion) of ex-combatants from signatory armed groups. This support is complemented by community stabilization projects, which are aimed at creating temporary economic and training opportunities for youth at risk and internally displaced persons. Although disarmament, demobilization and reintegration already constitute a mandated task, greater clarity regarding the mandate in this area would be advantageous, especially in the light of the peace process and the representation of rebel groups. Any support provided to civilian disarmament efforts or the integration of militia groups remains outside the mission's current purview.

C. Intercommunal conflicts

42. In support of the prevention and mitigation of community conflicts, UNAMID has developed a strategy and a set of mechanisms to address intercommunal conflicts. In addition, specific initiatives such as the rehabilitation of natural water points along migratory routes and the establishment of "crop protection committees" are deemed to have considerably improved the access of nomadic herders to water and the interaction with the farmers' communities. Additional requests are formulated in support of the provision of services along the migration routes. In view of the numerous requests and in the context of limited resources, the mission is considering refocusing activities towards supporting the state authorities and the native administration in addressing conflicts of high impact on civilians and the national political processes.

D. Transfer of tasks

43. The transfer of tasks as currently mandated is incongruent with how United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are structured and resourced. Owing to the lack of resources available to the United Nations country team, most tasks considered for handover to the country team in the areas of gender and HIV/AIDS have been discontinued. With regard to the transition of certain justice and corrections tasks, assessed programmatic funds were transferred to UNDP to implement clearly defined legal aid tasks and strengthen its capacity to mobilize further resources to continue this activity beyond July 2017, but its extremely low capacity in Darfur remains a concern. A handover of task therefore remains unrealistic if partners continue not to be funded at levels sufficient to carry out most of the tasks being handed over.

44. It is therefore recommended that a United Nations strategy for sustaining peace in Darfur be designed, with a phased transition that may include support for the transfer of personnel and funds, and for a joint UNAMID and United Nations country team fundraising strategy to ensure the maximization of pooled resources and efforts. To help to address this funding shortfall, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNAMID should offer full support to country team partners in the Sudan and New York to raise voluntary funds for development projects that are important for stabilization in Darfur.

E. Operational challenges

45. The review team noticed a positive trend in the issuance of visas for UNAMID and the clearance of shipments for the mission, which began in the course of 2016. During the period from 1 January 2016 to 1 May 2017, the mission submitted 3,576 visa requests, of which 3,095 were approved, representing an approval rate of 89 per cent. Although the vacancy rate for international civilian staff due to difficulties with visa issuance decreased from the previous reporting period, from 46 per cent to 43 per cent, challenges remain for the Human Rights Section.

46. Following a similar trend, while all pending food ration containers have been released from Port Sudan, customs clearance for 123 shipments of equipment owned by contingents of UNAMID and the United Nations remained held at Port Sudan and in Khartoum. Some shipments containing communications facilities, vehicles and waste management systems have been awaiting clearance since 2015, accumulating demurrages of more than \$1.2 million.

47. Overall, there has been a significant improvement in freedom of movement, particularly in the processing of travel documents. The mission experienced 18 access restrictions in the first trimester of 2017, compared with 64 in the last trimester of 2016 and 50 in the first trimester of the same year. In January and February 2017, UNAMID and humanitarian actors received government clearance to conduct inter-agency missions in some of the previously inaccessible parts of Jebel Marra. Restrictions remain in place on the conduct of night patrols all over Darfur, seriously hampering the protection activities of UNAMID uniformed units.

IV. Proposed adjustments to UNAMID

48. The strategic review team concludes that UNAMID deals with two sets of issues that are both related to the root causes of the conflict: first, the continued instability in the greater Jebel Marra area and the ensuing displacement in the vicinity; and second, intercommunal violence. Both have emerged from the marginalization of Darfur and the dispute over the scarce resources (especially land and water) and have been exacerbated by the proliferation of militias.

A. Refocusing the mission's mandate

49. In the light of the above, the strategic review team proposes a two-pronged approach to a new concept of operations that combines peacebuilding and peacekeeping tasks. The areas outside Jebel Marra and the affected vicinity, that is, those areas where there has not been any fighting for years, necessitate a more peacebuilding-oriented approach than Jebel Marra. In those areas, the role of UNAMID should be, in collaboration with the United Nations country team, to stabilize the situation, support the police and help to build rule of law institutions while continuing to mediate intercommunal friction and investing resources in the residual commissions/funds of the Darfur Regional Authority to develop adequate legislation (especially on land and resource management), and to follow up on security sector reform-related issues and the implementation of the Doha Document.

50. The greater Jebel Marra area, by contrast, still requires traditional peacekeeping and emergency attention owing to the insecurity prevailing in the area, which prevents internally displaced persons from returning. A concerted effort should be undertaken through a time-bound Jebel Marra task force in which military protection, clearance of explosive remnants of war and emergency relief are combined and coordinated with the humanitarian country team in order to deal with the stabilization of the area and its hinterland through a Jebel Marra action plan. The mission should therefore be configured to address those issues in a two-track concept of operations. UNAMID state offices should also be strengthened and headquarters thinned out so that the mission can work more closely with the state governments and develop plans that address the needs of each state, as needs and hotspots vary greatly.

51. The mission's priorities still address the main issues at stake and provide a good "chapeau" for the tasks that UNAMID should undertake and where it has the most value added. However, the focus of these priorities needs to be adjusted, as do the indicators of the existing benchmarks.

B. Reconfiguration of the military and police components

52. The main military effort of UNAMID should concentrate on the Jebel Marra task force, including enablers. In parallel, steps would be taken to draw down in the

five sectors, thus ensuring that UNAMID is predominantly civilian in character in those areas to be able to carry out the required peacebuilding tasks. In stable areas, the formed police units would undertake tasks delinked from those performed by the force so as to be in a position to operate independently. At the same time, adequate capability would be retained to respond to any situation requiring a military response. That concept, which includes the closure of 11 team sites and the withdrawal of the military from another 7 team sites out of a current total of 36, represents a reduction of 44 per cent of the authorized ceiling for the military and 30 per cent for the police component. The proposed reconfiguration would be carried out in two phases, each extending over a period of six months.

53. In the first phase, the task force would be established at brigade strength, with headquarters in Zalingei. It would include the temporary operating base to be established in Golo and incorporate the following team sites: Zalingei and Nertiti (Sector Central); Shangil Tobaya, Sortony, Kabbabiyah and Tawilah (Sector North); Kass, Menawashei and Khor Abeche (Sector South). The following 11 team sites will be closed: El Fasher/Abou Shouk, El Fasher/Zamzam, Al-Malihah, Um Kaddadah, Tine and Mellit (Sector North); Habila and Foro Burunga (Sector West); Edd al-Fursan and Tulus (Sector South); and Muhajiriyah (Sector East). The military troop level at the end of the first phase will be 11,395, as opposed to the current level of 15,845, while the police component will be reduced from 3,403 to 2,748.

54. In the second phase, lasting six months, military units would withdraw from the following seven team sites: Kalma (Sector South); Masteri (Sector West); Sheria (Sector East); and Saraf Omra, Korma, Umm Barru and Sereif (Sector North). At the end of the second phase, the central reserve battalion and four reserve companies located in the state capitals would be withdrawn. UNAMID would nonetheless maintain a military presence with appropriate troop strength in each state as a "security assistance force", including command and control elements. The police would continue to remain in the above-mentioned seven team sites, from which the military will withdraw in the second phase, and formed police units would be responsible for the provision of UNAMID camp security while continuing with the mandated tasks. At the end of the second phase, the military troop level would be reduced to eight infantry battalions (from the previous 16), with a total force strength of 8,735, while the police strength would stand at 2,360.

55. Considering the volatility of the security environment, the impact of the envisioned reduction of the UNAMID footprint has to be effectively mitigated by adequate and mobile quick-response capabilities so as to retain the minimum capacity required to respond to security challenges based on the early warning information that the mission receives. In view of the very significant cuts recommended with respect to the size of the force, there will clearly be a need for the Government to develop viable security plans and arrangements to fill the resulting gaps and mobilize the resources required to ensure their effective implementation.

C. Political process

56. In terms of the political process, stronger focus should be placed on the effective implementation of the Doha Document, which is incorporated into the Constitution and contains useful provisions to address the underlying causes of conflict and to provide a peace dividend for the population in Darfur. UNAMID should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Document's implementation for a more focused approach on the outstanding provisions of the agreement and work jointly with UNDP and the commissions under the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office

to address land and disarmament issues in particular. This also includes efforts to advance the normalization of the security sector in Darfur, which UNAMID might not be equipped to tackle as a lead actor but to which it could contribute in a supporting role. In this context, tackling the proliferation of arms and the presence of militias is paramount to preventing a relapse into conflict in the medium term. Furthermore, the mission should support the implementation of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation at the local level.

57. As for peace negotiations with rebel movements, it has become increasingly evident that the two movements that are willing to participate in the process, namely SLA/MM and JEM, currently do not have any military presence in Darfur. Although remnants remain in South Sudan (JEM) and Libya (SLA/MM), with the latter probably well-equipped and active in the local conflict, the ongoing negotiations appear out of sync with the situation on the ground. The initiative of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, supported by the Joint Special Representative, for an all-inclusive political process linked to the national dialogue and a national constitutional reform process should remain the guiding principle for UNAMID support within the overall mediation structure, as set out in African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CDLVI) and reiterated in subsequent Security Council resolutions and Peace and Security Council communiqués.

58. In this context, the mission's priorities should remain: (a) support for the implementation of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel framework for ending the conflicts in the Sudan; (b) engagement with the Government of the Sudan and armed movements to sign and implement a cessation of hostilities agreement; and (c) full implementation of the remaining provisions of the Doha Document.

D. Protection of civilians

59. The protection of civilians, including women and children, and the facilitation of humanitarian access remain a key priority for the mission. Given the new two-pronged concept of operations proposed above, activities with regard to the protection of civilians will also shift, in alignment with the mission's newly refined protection of civilians strategy. In the greater Jebel Marra, in collaboration with the humanitarian country team, the protection of civilians will heavily revolve around the Jebel Marra task force action plan, whereas in the rest of the Darfur states it will focus on livelihood issues and police/rule of law capacities. The team also discussed the possibility of a strategy on human rights to establish a working relationship at the federal level by strengthening the human rights presence in the Khartoum Liaison Office in order to engage with the Government and key human rights institutions created through the Doha Document. The Government's support in this respect will be crucial.

60. Specifically, the team recommends the establishment of a temporary operating base in Golo in support of the facilitation of humanitarian efforts and the protection of civilians as part of the Jebel Marra task force. In addition, it is recommended that the mission, in conjunction with the humanitarian country team, conduct a comprehensive situational analysis and needs assessment to prioritize areas for clearance of explosive remnants of war and identify possible quick-impact projects and community stabilization projects for interventions in Golo and the north of Central Darfur, as well as the wider Jebel Marra, in support of returns.

61. Third-tier protection activities should focus on the establishment of a protective environment by strengthening the capacity of the state, especially the

police and judicial actors, promoting respect for human rights, facilitating the representation and participation of women, preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence and enhancing the protection of children and should be accelerated in areas where fighting has subsided, as part of stabilization efforts and support for the Government.

62. Given the challenges that prevail with regard to the protection of human rights in Darfur and the opportunities that arise from current developments, the following human rights priorities remain for UNAMID: (a) monitoring and reporting, including trial monitoring; (b) advocacy for the implementation of the provisions of the Doha Document on militia groups and disarmament; (c) advocacy for the lifting of emergency laws in Darfur and the arresting powers of the National Intelligence and Security Service; (d) support for and capacity-building of the human rights and justice mechanisms under the Doha Document, namely the Sudan National Human Rights Commission, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Special Court for Darfur Crimes and the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur; (e) increased human rights personnel in Khartoum to support institutional development, advocacy with authorities and increased capacity-building aimed at strengthening transitional justice and human rights institutions; (f) support for the implementation of the Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur.

63. The strategic review team recommends that UNAMID and the United Nations country team work with Darfur state governments and other available partners to develop comprehensive peace stabilization plans led by the state government and the native administration for local areas that are most important for durable solutions to problems of displaced populations, and to support the Government in creating conditions conducive to a reduction in violence. In this regard, the two Councils should consider including the mandated tasks of helping the Government and native administrations to extend state authority in all five states of Darfur by strengthening rule of law efforts and supporting state capacity for the mediation of intercommunal conflict, to develop and implement peace stabilization plans for key areas for returns of internally displaced persons or areas of the Jebel Marra with potential for renewed armed conflict.

64. The Ordnance Disposal Office should remain anchored in UNAMID, with explosive remnants of war clearance, risk education and technical advice tasks until such time that the National Mine Action Centre will be fully capable of effectively assuming mine action responsibilities throughout the territory. Such tasks are sine qua non conditions for the mission's movement, the facilitation of delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of the displaced population. The Office should use its capacity to support the mission in wider reconciliation efforts through assistance to victims of explosive remnants of war. Simultaneously, community stabilization projects should be enhanced as the emphasis of UNAMID increasingly moves away from the provision of physical security to the stabilization of key areas affected by the conflict and vital for the voluntary return of internally displaced persons.

65. The Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur provides the framework necessary to contribute to sustaining peace in Darfur. Considering current funding shortfalls, the implementation of the Programme should be sequenced, focusing on immediate priorities for community and institutional stabilization, including community security, access to justice, strengthening of the criminal justice chain in return areas and human rights protection.

66. While the disarmament of armed militias is a complex endeavour, the issue should be addressed in a sustainable way, including by taking into account their

grievances. The African Union and the United Nations could offer technical assistance to the Government of the Sudan on how to implement relevant provisions of the Doha Document. Initiatives that aim to bring the militia into an accountability framework, similar to the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the national armed forces, should be supported. Furthermore, the mission should support initiatives whereby the communities of internally displaced persons engage militia groups in mediation with the state authorities towards solutions for their return and resettlement. With reference to the proliferation of weapons among the civilian population, the review team recommends that the mission support the efforts of the Government towards an arms control approach. The team also recommends that, on security sector-related issues, specifically on "the reform of some military institutions", as provided in the Doha Document (art. 74, paras. 463-464), the African Union Security Sector Reform Framework could be useful in guiding further engagement with the Government of the Sudan.

E. Intercommunal conflict

67. On the issue of intercommunal conflicts, the strategic review team is of the view that the recent efforts to develop state strategies have worked well but that a stronger partnership should be struck with the United Nations country team, which requires additional donor support if it is to serve as a strong partner with UNAMID on the issue of seasonal migration and the extension of the rule of law institutions, while working on tackling the root causes through a legislative and institutional framework developed at the federal level. This should be based on the institutional and physical infrastructure built by UNAMID and the local authorities to address such conflicts, including state coordination mechanisms with local authorities, crop protection working groups, the demarcation of corridors and the construction of water and service points.

68. The strategic review team is of the view that the work of the mission and the United Nations country team should prioritize those intercommunal conflicts, which have the potential: (a) to cause the highest number of casualties; and (b) to derail national political processes. Such an approach will inform the prioritization of mission efforts to prevent local violence and the allocation of resources for mitigation and response.

69. Based on the above, the review team recommends that the benchmark of the intercommunal conflicts, namely prevention or mitigation of community conflict through mediation and, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, measures to address its root causes, remains relevant. It is proposed, however, that the requirements for progress relate to the residual provisions of the Doha Document and former Darfur Regional Authority commissions and include: (a) strengthened traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and greater respect thereof; (b) establishment of a legal and institutional framework to address the root causes of intercommunal conflict; (c) provision of access to the United Nations country team to enable measures that address root causes related to natural resources, recovery and reconstruction. Specific indicators should reflect the provisions of the Doha Document on the Darfur Land Commission, the Darfur land-use mapping database, legislation on empowering the native administration and provisions on oil revenues. UNAMID should focus on its support role to local initiatives through good offices and advisory and logistical support.

F. Impact of the drawdown on mission structure and management

70. As the military and police reconfigure their deployment and posture, the civilian component will have to be equally adjusted to a greater presence in the field offices and a less heavy headquarters in El Fasher and at the state level. Once the new mandate of UNAMID is adopted, it will be necessary to conduct a comprehensive civilian staffing review to ensure that staffing levels are adjusted to implement the revised mandate.

71. The security posture of the mission also needs to be assessed and reviewed by the Department of Safety and Security and the mission leadership, through the Security Management Team and in coordination with UNAMID military and police, to reduce heavy escorts and protection arrangements that do not seem necessary, especially in the state capitals. Not only do the current arrangements not correspond to security developments on the ground, but they also have a negative impact on mandate delivery and the image of UNAMID. This might also have an impact on mission classification and related issues.

V. Observations

72. We are encouraged by the improvement of the security situation, the political developments in the context of the national dialogue and the positive regional environment in view of the cross-border cooperation between the Central African Republic, Chad, the Sudan and Uganda. While it is widely accepted that UNAMID has contributed to the stabilization of the security situation and the overall protection of civilians environment, the mission should adjust to the new realities in Darfur and the Sudan.

73. Overall, the African Union-United Nations framework for the facilitation of the Darfur peace process established in 2012 remains relevant. In view of the above, the mediation process should be adjusted under the leadership of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. We call upon the movements to demonstrate courage and vision by engaging in the implementation of the Doha Document, which constitutes a useful political framework, now part of the national Constitution, to address the root causes of the conflict and create peace dividends for the people of Darfur.

74. The rapidly changing landscape in Darfur opens up an opportunity for a more cooperative relationship between the Government and UNAMID. We call upon the Government of the Sudan to positively engage with UNAMID and the United Nations country team towards the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Doha Document, especially those related to the underlying causes of conflict.

75. As UNAMID is evolving in response to the security and political developments in Darfur, we recommend the extension of its mandate for 12 months and suggest that a joint African Union-United Nations report be submitted to both Councils by 1 March 2018 containing an assessment of the proposed reconfiguration in the light of the prevailing political and security situation and, provided that the current trends continue, recommendations, as part of the exit strategy, for further steps in the drawdown of the Operation, for consideration by both Councils during the discussion on the mandate in 2018.



Security Council

Distr.: General
18 May 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of Kazakhstan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 18 May 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations stating that Mr. Yerkin Tukumov, Head of Department of the National Security Council, will represent Kazakhstan at the 7943rd meeting of the Security Council, to be held on 18 May 2017.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.





Security Council

Distr.: General
19 May 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 18 May 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to forward a letter dated 27 April 2017 from the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, to the Secretary-General, drawing attention to the continued violations by India of the Charter of the United Nations and international covenants and conventions on human rights with regard to demographic changes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council in connection with the item entitled "The India-Pakistan question".

(Signed) Nabeel Munir
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 18 May 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

**Letter dated 27 April 2017 from the Adviser to the Prime Minister
of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General**

Jammu and Kashmir dispute

We deeply appreciate your expression of interest in helping to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, soon after you assumed charge of the office.

As you are aware, the human rights situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir has been a matter of profound concern for a long time, particularly the large-scale killing and blinding of hundreds of Kashmiris, including children, using pellet guns. Injuries and maimings, disappearances, false encounters, arrests and custodial killings and the rape of Kashmiri women, used as a tool to terrorize them, as well as systematic changes in demography to convert a Muslim-majority territory into a Muslim-minority state, are commonplace. India has not only constantly violated the Charter of the United Nations and all the international covenants and conventions on human rights in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, but also blatantly disrespected Security Council and United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions on Kashmir.

Demographic changes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

India is trying to bring demographic changes to institute Hindu domination in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. I wish to apprise you of the recent developments in this regard in the succeeding part of the present letter. I have also enclosed relevant data, which serve as empirical evidence of Indian plans for demographic changes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.* In this regard, the following steps are being taken by India:

- **Settlement of West Pakistan refugees.** A recent proposal by the 31-member Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs of the Indian Government to permanently settle the "West Pakistan refugees" in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir has created unrest among the people of the Kashmir Valley. The so-called West Pakistan refugees do not hail from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Government is trying slowly and gradually to integrate them into Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, which is not only a violation of the state Constitution, but also a violation of Security Council resolutions on the Kashmir dispute, which forbid any material change until the implementation of the resolutions. Details regarding West Pakistan refugees are provided in enclosure I.
- **Issuance of permanent resident certificates.** Another attempt to change the demography of Indian-occupied Kashmir is a move in which children of Hindu families who do not belong to Jammu and Kashmir are being issued permanent resident certificates. To date, 500 such certificates have been issued to students in the Kishtwar district of Jammu, out of a proposed 5,000 in total.
- **Allotment of land to retired army personnel.** Recently, a new proposal has been floated to establish "Sainik" colonies by allotting land to retired army personnel who have served in Kashmir for a minimum of three years and to the families of army personnel who died during fighting in Kashmir. Under the

* The enclosures are being circulated in the language of submission only.

guise of a welfare measure, an attempt is being made to settle non-Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

- **Issuance of land to non-Kashmiri Hindu industrialists.** Non-Kashmiri Hindu industrialists are being allotted land for establishing industries in areas other than industrial zones.
- **Establishment of separate townships for Kashmiri pandits.** The Government of India has asked the state government to earmark land for separate towns in the Valley for Kashmiri pandits, who are presently settled in different Indian states. Land for separate townships was identified in seven places, out of which land at three places has been shortlisted. Details regarding Kashmiri pandits are provided in enclosure II. While the Hurriyat leadership in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and the general public have always welcomed the return of Kashmiri pandits to their ancestral lands, they oppose the idea of separate townships, which would not only enable the Indian Government to settle non-Kashmiris there but would also enable manipulation on religious, social and political lines.

I hope, in all earnestness, that the foregoing will receive the urgent attention of the United Nations, the Security Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The non-implementation of Security Council resolutions is leading to a grave human tragedy in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. It is the obligation of the United Nations to implement the Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir and to fulfil the promises made to the Kashmiris 70 years ago. This will not only end the immense sufferings of the millions of people of Jammu and Kashmir, but also bring peace and stability in South Asia.

(Signed) Sartaj Aziz

Enclosure I

WEST PAKISTAN REFUGEES

- These are the people who had migrated from West Pakistan at the time of partition and got settled from time to time in Jammu
- The refugees have been demanding state subject status of Jammu and Kashmir and have been fighting legal battles, as well
- **Total number of refugees : Varying from 150,000 to 17,00,000 (As put by different relevant organizations)**

Highlights of the Recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee

1. Granting of citizenship rights and rights to vote for legislative Assembly
2. Opening of Govt. schools for their wards
3. One time financial package of 3 million rupees

Concessions approved after recommendations

- Recruitment in Central Armed Police Forces
- Admission to children of refugees in Kendriya Vidyalaya Schools
- Waiving off condition of producing Domicile Certificate for recruitment in Defense Forces



Luba Ram Gandhi: Leader of the Refugees Association

SETTLEMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN REFUGEES - A SINISTER DESIGN

Recently, a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs of India has recommended to the Government of India to confer benefit of 'State Subject' and issue Permanent Resident Certificate to the West Pakistan Refugees (WPRs) who migrated to IOK in 1947. After the consent of Ministry of Home Affairs, the State Government will be required to approve it and make necessary amendment in the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir for implementing the recommendations. There are total of 1.1 Million such refugees out of which 0.15 Million are Hindus who migrated from Sialkot, Lahore and Jhelum and settled in various parts of Jammu (Lakhanpur to Akhnoor). These Refugees were not given Permanent Resident Certificate by the State Government as they were non-Kashmir residents of West Pakistan. Recommendations made by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs are given as under:-

- Constitution of Welfare and Relief Commission / Development Board.
- Granting Permanent Resident Certificate (PRC) to the west-Pakistani refugees.
- Right of vote and representation in both Houses of Jammu and Kashmir.
- Reservation of two seats in the State Assembly of IOK for WPRs and defreezing of 8 seats out of 24 which are designated for AIK in favour of displaced persons (DPs).
- Reservation of jobs in Armed Forces and raising of separate Battalion in State police, Army and Paramilitary Forces.
- Reservation of seats for their Wards in Technical and other professional Institutions.
- Indian Rupees 30 Lakh package per family of the WPRs as one time financial assistance.
- Provision of monthly cash and Ration, etc.

Implications This is an Indian attempt to bring demographic changes in IOK by bringing Hindu WPRs at par with Kashmiri Pandits. Some of the implications of this move are given as under:-

- It will enhance Hindu population in IOK with increased influence in Jammu region.
- WPRs will be allowed to buy properties in IOK, which will facilitate in enlarging the base of Hindu population in Kashmir Valley as well.
- WPRs will become entitled to cast vote, thereby enhancing support to the Hindu candidates.

- After issuance of Permanent Resident Certificate, seats of Jammu region will be enhanced from 37 to 47, which will tilt the balance of political power towards Jammu.
- By settling WPRs, Centre will increase its influence in J&K and will be able to steer the weak Muslim governments according to its own design.

Now, West Pak refugees can apply for armed forces

The decades-long issue of the West Pakistani refugees pushed by BJP government, as the state government today issued an order to issue identity certificates to them.

In his order today, Deputy Commissioner, Jammu, Simranjeet Singh has directed all tehsildars of Jammu district to issue identity certificates to the West Pakistani refugees in the state for the purpose of recruitment of their children settled in J&K in the Indian Armed Forces. The order has been issued with reference to the Divisional Commissioner, Jammu, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Deputy Commissioner directed all tehsildars to ensure a smooth and hassle-free procedure of issuing the certificates and said the applicants should not be put to any inconvenience. The certificate will be issued by the naib tehsildars concerned.

A delegation of the West Pakistani refugees had met Home Minister Rajnath Singh on March 10, 2016, and had demanded issuance of certificate to entitle their children to recruitment in the Indian Armed Forces. Today's order was a follow-up action by the Union Home Ministry.

In January this year, the Home Ministry had directed the heads of all Central Armed Police Forces to consider the refugees for recruitment and include them in the recruitment drives conducted in the state.

Most of the West Pakistan refugees are settled in the Jammu region. They had fled Pakistan during Partition. The special status of J&K bars outsiders from getting the permanent resident status. The Ministry of Home Affairs has said the refugees, who are Indian citizens and have valid voter ID cards, be considered for recruitment in the forces.

Identity certificates


Deputy Commissioner, Jammu, Simranjeet Singh on Wednesday directed all tehsildars of Jammu district to issue identity certificates to the West Pakistani refugees in the state for the purpose of recruitment of their children in the Indian Armed Forces.

With this push, Indian government will try to settle these non-state subjects which will be an attempt to change the demography of the State thus violating the Constitution.

Enclosure II**SEPARATE TOWNSHIPS FOR KASHMIRI PANDITS**

Under the plan, three dedicated satellite cities would be developed in three districts of the valley for Kashmiri Pandits. One city each would come up in Central, South and North Kashmir respectively. The cities would be high tech and would be provided with all the following facilities:

- *A medical college each duly recognized by the state Government would be set up in the three satellite cities.*
- *Two Regional Engineering Colleges would come up in every satellite city.*
- *12 police stations would be set up in the three satellite cities so that there is no threat to the lives of Kashmiri Pandits.*
- *four-degree colleges each would be established in the satellite cities.*
- *In addition to these 9 to 12 schools each would exist in the cities.*



Structures built for Pandits at Sheikhpora in Baramulla



Pandits living in Flats in Jammu built by the government

SEPARATE TOWNSHIPS FOR KASHMIRI PANDITS

Government of India had asked previous State Government to earmark land for separate towns for KPs in Valley who are presently settled in different states including Delhi. As per the Government data, there are total of 60,450 families comprising 3 Lakh people whereas, as per the Human Right NGOs state, strength is as follows:-

- Total Families - 55,304 families
- In Jammu - 34,105 families (Hindu-32,356, Sikh-1,749)
- In Delhi - 19,338 families
- Other States - 1,861 families


As per Alexander Evans, a British expert on Kashmir, the estimated number is between 150,000 to 160,000 only which is being exaggerated. During recent elections, 21 polling stations were established for KPs in Jammu, exclusively for those settled in Jammu and different states.

BJP has initiated a move through its "Vision Document" to have separate three (3) assembly seats for KPs in the Valley. Presently, these KPs are spread over 16 constituencies and Hindu votes are divided in the Valley. Security Agencies including Indian Army, IB, RAW and BSF have however opposed the initiative due to the security reasons.

As per the recent survey, only 6000 families are willing to come back to the Valley. The scheme will require huge financial support which may even contribute in delaying the project.

PANDIT COLONIES: 7 SITES IDENTIFIED

Srinagar, Jun 16 2016 Greater Kashmir



Authorities in Kashmir have identified seven sites for construction of transit accommodations for displaced Kashmiri Pandits who want to return to the Valley, sources told Greater Kashmir.

Highly placed sources Wednesday revealed that DCs- who had been directed by the Government to identify land for construction of transit accommodation for Kashmiri Pandits who left the Valley in 90s, have proposed seven sites in different parts of Kashmir for the purpose.

The sites, according to sources, have been proposed in all three parts of Kashmir- North, South and Central.

In Central Kashmir district of Srinagar, the district administration has identified over 206.1 kanal land at Shivpora area of the city.

According to sources, six such places have been scouted in South and North Kashmir.

The DCs, in south Kashmir, have identified land at Choudary Gund Shopain (52.04 kanal), Mattan- Islamabad (25 kanal) and Hall Pulwama (95.12 Kanal) for the purpose.

The authorities in north Kashmir have proposed Kanispora Baramulla (154.09 kanal), Sara-i-Dangerpora Bandipora (68 kanal) and Kharman Kupwara (41.16 kanal) for the purpose.

Several DCs, who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed to Greater Kashmir that they have identified the land. "We have submitted all details regarding the land to the Government," they said.

As already reported by this newspaper, the State Government on Saturday revealed in the Legislative Assembly that 725.02 kanal land has been identified in Kashmir Valley for construction of transit accommodations for Kashmiri migrants who were recruited or would be recruited under Prime Minister's Development Package (PMDP) for the State.

The Government, however, had said suitability of the identified land was being ascertained by a committee constituted for the purpose.

According to sources, a high-level panel headed by Divisional Commissioner Kashmir has been constituted to look into feasibility and suitability of the land identified by DCs.

"The preliminary exercise regarding identification of the land has been carried out by respective DCs. Now the committee would look into whether these sites are suitable for constructing transit accommodations keeping in view different factors including security considerations," they said, but added that "nothing has been finalized yet."

"The land identified at these places is private land," they said.

The State Revenue Minister Syed BashratulBakhara had already informed the house that transit accommodations were being built for return of Kashmiri migrants under the Prime Minister's Development Package 2015.

Under the package, the Government of India has proposed construction of 6000 additional transit accommodation units in the Valley for the migrants, apart from 4000 additional jobs for them.

Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has repeatedly said over the past few weeks that there wouldn't be exclusive colonies for Kashmiri Pandits but they would be settled in transit accommodations before they decide to move to their original places.

"These will be transit accommodations and not townships where 50 percent of accommodation would be kept for Pandits and the remaining 50 percent for people from other communities," she has said.

The separatist groups, on the other hand, are up in arms against what they say Government's plans to set up Pandit colonies in Kashmir.

Govt has identified land in Baramulla for Kashmiri Pandit colony, say J&K officials

The Jammu and Kashmir government has finally identified a big chunk of land in North Kashmir's Baramulla district, close to the national highway and railway station, for setting up a colony for Kashmiri Pandits, officials have said.

The state government has been under pressure from the Centre for setting up separate colonies for Kashmiri Pandits in central, north and south Kashmir.

Officials said the state revenue department has finally agreed to on a big chunk of land spread over more than 200 kanals at Ranispora Jhelum on the outskirts of

Baramulla district. They added that the state government has held talks with the owner of the land and he has reportedly agreed to give it to the government.

Revenue officials in Baramulla told The Indian Express that the land is being procured for a transit colony, like the ones the government has already set up for Kashmiri Pandit employees who volunteered to work in the Valley and were given government jobs.



Security Council

Distr.: General
19 May 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 18 May 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a communication, dated 15 May 2017, which I received from the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (see annex). The letter transmits the note by the OPCW Technical Secretariat containing a status update of the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic regarding a reported incident in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António Guterres



Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you a document entitled "Note by the Technical Secretariat: status update of the OPCW fact-finding mission in Syria regarding a reported incident in Khan Shaykhun, 4 April 2017" (see enclosure).

(Signed) Ahmet Üzümcü

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish]



OPCW

Technical Secretariat

S/2017/440
12 May 2017
Original: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

**STATUS UPDATE OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA
REGARDING A REPORTED INCIDENT IN KHAN SHAYKHUN, 4 APRIL 2017**

1. Initiation

- 1.1 Immediately after the incident in Khan Shaykhun was reported in the media on 4 April 2017, the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) commenced the collection and review of all relevant information.
- 1.2 These reports, including posts on the social media, presented a situation of a potentially large number of casualties resulting from possible exposure to a toxic substance.
- 1.3 A preliminary assessment was undertaken and, in view of the gravity of the reports, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") of the OPCW instructed that all FFM resources be mobilised to analyse the incident. Given that the nature and extent of the information available qualified the incident as a credible account of a possible use of a toxic chemical, an initial FFM team was able to deploy in less than 24 hours.
- 1.4 Active monitoring of the media by the Information Cell and by the FFM continued. This allowed the FFM to map the site of the reported incident, and to identify potential interviewees and possible evidence. Through reports and information from States Parties, the Secretariat was made aware of a number of casualties having been taken, or having made their way, to a neighbouring country.

2. Deployment Activities

- 2.1 As the FFM was already engaged in analysing a number of recently reported incidents on the alleged use of chemicals as weapons, it had access to lines of communication with parties with knowledge of and connections to the area in question. These contacts were used to quickly identify the initial casualties from this incident. This rapid mobilisation was crucial, in the first instance, in allowing FFM team members to attend the autopsies of three victims and to witness the extraction of biomedical samples from the bodies.



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- 2.2 On Wednesday 5 April 2017, two team members attended the autopsies of three alleged victims. The team noted that the bodies were intact and, aside from one victim having been intubated, showed no signs of traumatic injury and had no broken bones. The FFM has received the autopsy reports.
- 2.3 On Saturday 8 April, the FFM team was able to visit ten patients in three hospitals, whilst there was still a high potential for retrieving relevant biomedical samples and associated testimony.
- 2.4 The team witnessed the collection of biomedical samples from ten casualties (blood samples from 10, and urine samples from five), and was able to meet with casualties from the alleged incident. The team interviewed a limited number of these casualties and one treating physician.
- 2.5 The team did not perform any interviews in public areas and were unable to perform interviews with those who were unconscious or barely conscious. The duration of interviews was kept as long as permitted by a patient's condition.
- 2.6 Biological-environmental samples (two dead birds and hair from a dead goat) were received by the FFM team on 12 and 13 April 2017. The FFM had been advised that these animals had been close to the incident site. Anatomical parts and internal organs were removed from the birds and taken by the team.
- 2.7 Environmental samples such as clothing, soil from the crater of the suspected impact point, and soil from locations close to the suspected impact point were received by the team on 13 April 2017.
- 2.8 At the time of handover, the team was informed that all samples were taken by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This information was corroborated by the testimony from other witnesses interviewed by the FFM. A representative of an NGO was also interviewed and provided photographs and videos from the scene of the alleged incident.
- 2.9 Based on the information available from various sources, the FFM identified a number of witnesses to be interviewed. These witnesses were expected to provide testimony and potentially relevant evidence. The FFM sought a variety of witnesses of different age ranges to cover differing aspects, including: the scene of the alleged incident; the location, rescue, condition, transport, and treatment of casualties; acquisition of samples.
- 2.10 As of Friday 12 May 2017, the FFM interviewed 29 witnesses (25 male, 4 female).
- 2.11 In addition to the biomedical samples collected in the presence of the FFM, further biomedical samples were collected in medical facilities in Syria by medical personnel operating in the opposition-controlled area. These samples were passed to the FFM team on 12 and 14 April. These will be analysed by Designated Laboratories (DL).
- 2.12 Amongst the casualties were four first responders, reported as showing signs of exposure. The FFM interviewed one of them, witnessed the collection of a blood sample by a nurse, and has requested that the blood sample be analysed for residual contamination. These will be analysed by designated laboratories.

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- 2.13 The FFM has interviewed a greater number of witnesses than would typically be expected for this type of mission. This relatively larger number will enhance corroboration among different testimonies and cross check the evidence provided. This will impart greater confidence in the narrative and any resultant conclusions.
- 2.14 All received samples were treated in accordance with OPCW procedures, including the application of seals by the FFM team. Full details will be supplied in the final report.

3. Laboratory Analysis

- 3.1 Several batches of samples, as indicated above, were collected by the FFM and transported to the OPCW Laboratory. Some samples had already been split into separate aliquots by the FFM. Those that had not been previously split were then split at the OPCW Laboratory before being transported to Designated Laboratories. The following table shows the timelines for receipt, transfer, and reporting.

	Source of sample	Received by FFM	Received at OPCW Lab	Shipped to DL	Preliminary results received by OPCW Lab		Final Results Received by OPCW Lab	
					DL 1	DL 2	DL 1	DL 2
1.	Blood from 3 autopsies	5 April	8 April	10 April	12 April	12 April	1 May	11 May
2.	Blood from 10 patients, urine from 5 patients	8 April	12 April	14 April	16 April	18 April	25 April	28 April
3.	Biological-environmental samples	12 April 13 April	21 April	25 April	3 May	3 May	19 May*	11 May
4.	Environmental samples	13 April	21 April	25 April	3 May	3 May	9 May	17 May*

*Estimated date of receipt

- 3.2 The biomedical samples collected from three victims during their autopsies were analysed at two OPCW designated laboratories. The results of the analyses indicate that the blood of victims was exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance. Biomedical samples from the ten individuals undergoing treatment at hospitals were also analysed at two OPCW designated laboratories. The results of the analyses indicate that seven of the casualties were exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance.
- 3.3 The results of the biological-environmental samples received from NGOs indicate that the two birds had been contaminated with or intoxicated with sarin or a sarin-like substance.
- 3.4 The results of the environmental samples show that soil and vegetation had been contaminated with sarin and expected degradation products of sarin. Clothing received from medical facilities did not show contamination with sarin or related substances.

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3.5 Full details of the samples taken and results to date are in the annexed tables.

4. Status as at 11 May 2017

4.1 This report constitutes an update on the activities of the FFM.

4.2 The FFM will conduct a complete analysis of the information and data at its disposal, including the results of sample analyses and mapping of the location of victims, as it drafts its report.

4.3 Meanwhile, planning is also under way in liaison with the United Nations regarding a possible visit to the alleged site of the incident at Khan Shaykhun. Given the sensitivity of the mission and past experience, this visit is dependent on the availability of the most stringent security assurances for the FFM.

Annexes

Annex 1: Results of Analysis of Samples Taken During Autopsies

Annex 2: Results from Biochemical Samples Taken in the Presence of the Team Members

Annex 3: Results from Environmental Samples

Annex 1

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES TAKEN DURING AUTOPSIES

No	Victim Reference	Blood			Brain			Hair			Liver			Lung		
		Sample Reference	Analysis Results	Sample Reference	Analysis Results	Sample Reference	Analysis Results	Sample Reference	Analysis Results	Sample Reference	Sample Reference	Analysis Results	Sample Reference	Sample Reference	Analysis Results	Sample Reference
1	683	683 Blood	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Brain	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Hair	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Liver	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	683 Lung
2	684	684 Blood	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Brain	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Hair	Negative for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Liver	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	684 Lung
3	685	685 Blood	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Brain	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Hair	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Liver	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Lung	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	685 Lung

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Annex 2

RESULTS FROM BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES TAKEN
IN THE PRESENCE OF TEAM MEMBERS

No	Patient Reference	Sample Reference	Blood	Sample Reference	Urine
			Analysis Results		Analysis Results
1	1321	1321/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	N/A	N/A
2	1355	1355/P	Nothing detected	1355/U	Nothing detected
3	1305	1305/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	N/A	N/A
4	1304	1304/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	N/A	N/A
5	1353	1353/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	N/A	N/A
6	1356	1356/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	1356/U	Isopropyl methylphosphonate
7	1302	1302/P	Nothing detected	N/A	N/A
8	1354	1354/P	Nothing detected	1354/U	Nothing detected
9	1320	1320/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	1320/U	Isopropyl methylphosphonate
10	1358	1358/P	Positive for sarin or sarin-like substance	1358/U	Isopropyl methylphosphonate

At the time the samples were taken, the team noted that one of the 10 casualties appeared to have trauma related injuries and further noted that his blood and urine tested negative for sarin or sarin-like substances. Seven of the remaining nine blood samples and three of the remaining four urine samples tested positive for sarin or a sarin-like substance or related metabolites.

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Annex 3

RESULTS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES

The analysis results below indicate the preliminary findings of scheduled chemicals and other chemicals of interest according to the "Scope of Analysis env 3" L/VER/LAB/209626-17, dated 25 April 2017.

No.	Sample code	Description	Analysis Results	
			DL #1	DL #2
Samples from medical facility				
1	10SDS	Clothes	n.d.	
2	11SDS	Clothes		n.d.
3	12SDS	Clothes	n.d.	
4	13SDS	Clothes		n.d.
5	14SDS	Clothes	n.d.	
Samples from the impact point of the alleged munition and the surrounding area				
6	15SDS	Vegetation 10m from location	IMPA, DIMP	IMPA, MPA, DIMP, hexamine
7	17SLS	Soil from crater	Sarin, IMPA, DIMP, hexamine, pyro	Sarin, IMPA, MPA, DIMP, hexamine, DIPF, HFP, TPP
8	18SLS	Rock from location	Sarin, IMPA, DIMP, hexamine	IMPA, MPA, DIMP, hexamine, HFP
9	19SLS	Soil 100m away	IMPA, DIMP	IMPA, MPA, DIMP
10	20SLS	Soil 50m away	IMPA, DIMP	IMPA, MPA, DIMP, TPP
Samples from dead animals found near the impact point				
11	16SDS	Goat hair, 20-30m away	IMPA	n.d.
12	22SDS	Bird: feathers	IMPA, DIMP	IMPA, MPA, DIMP, hexamine
13	46SDS	Bird: feathers	DIMP	DIMP, hexamine
14	21SDS	Bird: wings	IMPA, DIMP, hexamine	
15	23SDS	Bird: liver		Fluorene

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No.	Sample code	Description	Analysis Results	
			DL #1	DL #2
16	24SDS	Bird: heart	IMPA	
17	25SDS	Bird: pectoral muscles		Fl regen
18	46SDS	Bird: feathers and wings		IMPA, DIMP, hexamine
19	47SDS	Bird: brain	GB-tyr, IMPA, Fl regen	
20	48SDS	Bird: stomach	IMPA, Fl regen	
21	49SDS	Bird: Heart		Fl regen

Key	
DL	Designated laboratory
n.d.	No detection of relevant (as defined by the OPCW laboratory) chemicals
IMPA	Isopropyl methylphosphonate (first degradation product of sarin)
MPA	Methylphosphonic acid (second degradation product of sarin)
DIMP	Di-isopropyl methylphosphonate (bi-product of sarin production)
pyro	Di-isopropyl dimethylpyrophosphonate
DIPF	Di-isopropyl phosphorofluoridate
HFP	Hexafluorophosphate
TPP	Tri-isopropyl phosphate
Fl regen	Fluoride regeneration method – positive for sarin or sarin-like substance
GB-tyr	Tyrosine adduct of sarin or sarin-like substance

The scope of environmental analysis above requires the laboratories to perform a full, non-targeted organic analysis on the samples. This full analysis was performed for the environmental laboratories' preliminary reports; the final reports require more time for the laboratories to perform multiple analyses and detailed analytical reporting. Therefore, as some of the results above have been taken from the preliminary reports from the designated laboratories, additional information may be added in the final report.

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
23 May 2017

Original: English

**General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 41
Question of Cyprus****Security Council
Seventy-second year****Letter dated 19 May 2017 from the Permanent Representative of
Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instruction from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of March 2017. It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Timpou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued four notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in March 2017.

In addition, more recently the occupation regime has started interfering with radio frequencies, including distress and emergency frequencies, of the Republic of Cyprus, thus obstructing the smooth operation of the NAVTEX service that delivers navigational and meteorological warnings and forecasts, as well as urgent maritime safety information, to ships.

The actions of Turkey are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements of regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

It should further be underlined that the continuation of Turkey's illegal actions creates tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.



On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kornelios S. Korneliou

Annex I to the letter dated 19 May 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
1 March	0945-1106	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
	1007-1056	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1018-1044	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1028-1100	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1405-1423	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
2 March	0842-1054	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 March	1103-1220	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 March	0936-1116	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1030-1040	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1250-1414	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	2313-2333	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 March	0024-0033	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1203-1224	One P-42 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1316-1332	One P-42 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
9 March	1252-1312	One A-330 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
14 March	1039-1211	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 March	0856-1030	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1039-1101	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1606-1624	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
16 March	1035-1317	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
17 March	1230-1412	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
21 March	1119-1257	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1144-1150	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1155-1310	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1205-1247	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
22 March	0629-0645	One PC-12 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0852-0917	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1030-1142	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1420-1440	One PC-12 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
23 March	1100-1255	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1530-1630	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
25 March	1311-1355	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
28 March	1127-1200	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1443-1548	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
30 March	1010-1140	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1422-1533	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1448-1505	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 19 May 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
2-3 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
3-11 March	One P-331 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
12-15 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
14 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
16-17 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
17-20 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
17-30 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
21 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
21 March	One P-333 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
23-24 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.



Security Council

Distr.: General
24 May 2017

Original: Russian

**Letter dated 19 May 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 17-19 May 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) P. Ilichev
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 19 May 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of
Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (17 May 2017)**

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Hama, three in Damascus and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following governorates: two in Damascus, one in Homs and one in Dar'a.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out five humanitarian operations, including:

Three operations in Aleppo city, in which 3.6 tons of drinking water were delivered to the local population;

In Nubl in Aleppo governorate, 1.3 tons of food products were delivered to the local population;

In Dar'a, 1.7 tons of food parcels, toys and stationery supplies were delivered to the local population.

The total weight was 6.6 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 2,094 people.

In total, 1,225 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,497.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 218.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (18 May 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: six in Damascus, one in Ladhqiyyah and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations: two in Damascus governorate and one in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out four humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 4.8 tons of drinking water to the local population.

The total weight was 4.8 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,507 people.

In total, 1,229 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

Two United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out.

A humanitarian convoy was sent from Ramtha, Jordan, to Tayyibah in Dar'a governorate.

The Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,497.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 218.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (19 May 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire: three in Damascus governorate and three in Hama governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Hama governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 1.8 tons of food products to the local population.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 783 people.

In total, 1,235 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, eight ceasefire agreements have been signed with Tall al-Makhsar, Tall Abu Hayat, Tall-Halawa, Huwaysah al-Qibli, Huways al-Shamali and Dubay in Hama governorate and with Ayn Thawrah and Ballunah in Qunaytirah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,505.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire has increased to 219.

**Security Council**

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24 May 2017

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Albania, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay:
draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014) and the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2016/6) of 11 May 2016,

Affirming its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Stressing that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed,

Emphasizing that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

Urging Member States and the United Nations system to take measures, pursuant to international law, to address all drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism, both internal and external, in a balanced manner as set out in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,



Recalling the measures aimed at countering violent extremism in order to prevent terrorism, as outlined in resolution 2178 (2014),

Stressing also that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts and supporting terrorist organizations are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Recalling the right to freedom of expression, reflected in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 ("the Universal Declaration"), and recalling also the right to freedom of expression in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 ("ICCPR") and that any restrictions thereon shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary on the grounds set out in paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the ICCPR,

Condemning in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts and repudiating attempts at the justification or glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts,

Stressing the importance of the role of the media, civil and religious society, the business community and educational institutions in those efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding, and in promoting tolerance and coexistence, and in fostering an environment which is not conducive to incitement of terrorism, as well as in countering terrorist narratives,

Noting with concern that terrorist craft distorted narratives that are based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion to justify violence, which are utilized to recruit supporters and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), mobilize resources, and garner support from sympathizers, in particular by exploiting information and communications technologies, including through the Internet and social media,

Noting as well the urgent need to globally counter the activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities to incite and recruit to commit terrorist acts and recalling, in this regard and as reflected in the Statement of its President S/PRST/2016/6, its request to the Counter Terrorism Committee to present a proposal to the Security Council for a "comprehensive international framework" to effectively counter, in compliance with international law, the ways that ISIL (Da'esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities use their narratives to encourage, motivate, and recruit others to commit terrorist acts,

1. *Welcomes* its document entitled "Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives" number S/2017/375 with recommended guidelines and good practices to effectively counter the ways that ISIL (Da'esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities use their narratives to encourage, motivate, and recruit others to commit terrorist acts;

2. *Stresses* that Member States and all relevant United Nations entities should follow the subsequent guidelines while implementing the Comprehensive International Framework:

(a) United Nations action in the field of countering terrorist narratives should be based on the United Nations Charter, including the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States;

(b) Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;

(c) Relevant United Nations entities should ensure greater coordination and coherence with donors and recipients of counter-terrorism capacity-building, taking into account national perspectives, and with a view to strengthening national ownership;

(d) To be more effective, counter-narrative measures and programs should be tailored to the specific circumstances of different contexts on all levels;

(e) All measures taken by Member States to counter terrorism, including to counter terrorist narratives, must comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law;

(f) Efforts to counter terrorist narratives can benefit through engagement with a wide range of actors, including youth, families, women, religious, cultural, and education leaders, and other concerned groups of civil society;

(g) States should consider supporting the efforts aimed at raising public awareness regarding counter terrorist narratives through education and media, including through dedicated educational programs to pre-empt youth acceptance of terrorist narratives;

(h) The importance of promoting enhanced dialogue and broadened understanding among societies;

(i) States should consider engaging, where appropriate, with religious authorities and community leaders, that have relevant expertise in crafting and delivering effective counter-narratives, in countering narratives used by terrorists and their supporters;

(j) Counter-narratives should aim not only to rebut terrorists' messages, but also to amplify positive narratives, to provide credible alternatives and address issues of concern to vulnerable audiences who are subject to terrorist narratives;

(k) Counter-narratives should take into account the gender dimension, and narratives should be developed that address specific concerns and vulnerabilities of both men and women;

(l) Continued research into the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism is necessary in order to develop more focused counter-narrative programmes;

3. *Directs* the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the support of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), and in consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and other key actors, to facilitate international cooperation to implement the Comprehensive International Framework;

4. *Requests* the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), in this regard, to:

(a) Continue to identify and compile existing good practices in countering terrorist narratives, in coordination with the CTITF office, the CTITF Working Group on Communications, and where appropriate in consultation with other relevant non-United Nations entities;

(b) Continue to review legal measures taken by States to enhance implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014), and propose ways to strengthen international cooperation;

(c) Work with UNESCO, UNDP and other relevant United Nations agencies, through CTITF working groups, to promote, appropriate education-based efforts to recognize and prevent radicalization to violence and recruitment to terrorist groups;

(d) Contribute to efforts of the United Nations and its departments and agencies to develop models for effectively countering terrorist narratives, both online and offline;

(e) Further develop initiatives to strengthen public-private partnerships in countering terrorist narratives;

(f) Conduct outreach to entities with expertise and experience in crafting counter-narratives, including religious actors, civil society organizations, private-sector entities and others, to better inform the Committee's understanding of good practices;

(g) Work with outside partners, including members of the CTED Global Research Network, to identify possible ways to measure the impact and effectiveness of counter-narratives;

(h) Continue participating in meetings and workshops, at the global and regional levels, with the objective of highlighting and sharing relevant good practices more widely;

(i) Maintain an up-to-date list of national, regional and global counter narrative initiatives;

5. *Directs* the CTC, with the support of the CTED, to:

(a) Organize at least one open meeting annually to review developments globally in countering terrorist narratives;

(b) Recommend ways for Member States regarding capacity building to enhance their efforts in the field of counter terrorist narratives, including through assistance provided by CTITF member entities and other assistance providers;

(c) Use the existing CTED Research network and create an annual work plan to provide advice and to support the work of the CTC and CTED on various matters related to countering terrorist narratives;

6. *Directs* the CTC, with the support of the CTED, as appropriate, and within their respective mandates, to include in the country assessments Member States efforts to counter terrorist narratives;

7. *Emphasizes* the need for continued engagement between the CTC and CTED and all key actors in countering terrorist narratives;

8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 May 2017

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015), 2252 (2015), 2271 (2016), 2280 (2016), 2290 (2016), 2302 (2016), 2304 (2016), and 2327 (2016),

Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 May 2018 the measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2206 (2015), and the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2290 (2016);

2. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 2018 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of paragraph 12 of resolution 2290 (2016), and *decides* that the Panel of Experts should provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by 1 December 2017, a final report by 1 May 2018, and, except in the months when these reports are due, updates each month, and *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 31 May 2018;

3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



**Security Council**

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23 May 2017

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**Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016)****Report of the Secretary-General****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is the thirty-ninth submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), paragraph 10 of resolution 2165 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2191 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2258 (2015) and paragraph 5 of resolution 2332 (2016), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolutions by all parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The information contained herein is based on the data available to United Nations agencies on the ground and from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and other Syrian and open sources. Data from United Nations agencies on their humanitarian deliveries have been reported for the period from 1 to 30 April 2017.

Box 1**Key points in April 2017**

(1) Notwithstanding the ceasefire declared as at 30 December 2016, fighting in multiple areas resulted in continued civilian deaths and injury and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

(2) The United Nations estimates that, as of the end of April, some 624,500 people were living under siege in the Syrian Arab Republic, the overwhelming majority of sieges being imposed by Government forces and their allies (82 per cent) and by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Dayr al-Zawr (15 per cent). Furthermore, the United Nations estimates that some 3.9 million people are in hard-to-reach areas. These numbers are subject to change, given the ongoing evacuation processes in some areas.

(3) On 4 April, there were reports of a chemical weapons attack, in the Khan Shaykhun area of southern Idlib, that killed 90 people and injured 200. In response, on 7 April, the United States of America fired 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Sha'irat military airbase in rural Homs, asserting that the airbase was used to launch the reported chemical weapons strike on Khan Shaykhun.



(4) After reaching a local agreement on 27 March regarding the four towns of Madaya and Zabadani, in Rif Dimashq, and Fu'ah and Kafraya, in Idlib, simultaneous evacuations began on 15 April. While buses of evacuees waited for hours on either side of the checkpoint in Rashidin while parties addressed disagreements regarding the exchange, a car bomb struck the convoy originating in Fu'ah and Kafraya, killing at least 125 people and injuring 413. No party or group has claimed responsibility for this terrorist attack. Emergency medical care was swiftly provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Syrian Arab Republic and from Turkey, as well as by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

(5) The Brussels conference on the Syrian Arab Republic and the region successfully concluded on 5 April, with strong expressions of international commitment to continue to respond to the Syrian conflict.

(6) From 19 April, displacement in Raqqah governorate reportedly increased significantly, as non-State armed groups advanced to within 20 kilometres of ISIL-held Raqqah city. A total of 66,275 people were displaced in April, including approximately 39,000 people who were displaced to the Jubb al-Sha'ir area on 24 April.

(7) The United Nations and health partners received credible reports of 30 attacks that affected medical facilities and personnel throughout the month of April. The United Nations received credible information of two attacks against education facilities and related protected personnel.

II. Major developments

3. Throughout the month of April, intensified military activity continued, with fighting, including air strikes and artillery shelling, between pro-Government forces and non-State armed opposition groups reported in the governorates of Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Hama, Dar'a, Qunaytirah, Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and Ladhqiyyah. Pro-Government forces, Syrian Democratic Forces led by the Kurdish People's Protection Units, and the international coalition led by the United States of America to counter ISIL all continued their offensives against ISIL targets in Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr governorates.

4. On 4 April, the reported use of chemical weapons in an air strike in the Khan Shaykhun area of southern Idlib killed 90 and injured 200 people. In response, on 7 April, the United States fired 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Sha'irat military airbase in rural Homs, asserting that this airbase had been used to launch the chemical weapons strike on Khan Shaykhun. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has determined, from biomedical samples, that victims of the attack were exposed to sarin, or a sarin-like substance. The OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic is investigating the attack and is ready to deploy to Khan Shaykhun should the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic facilitate the visit and the security situation permit.

5. After reaching a local agreement on 27 March regarding the four towns of Madaya and Zabadani, in Rif Dimashq, and Fu'ah and Kafraya, in Idlib, simultaneous evacuations began on 15 April. Buses of evacuees waited for hours on either side of the checkpoint in Rashidin in Aleppo governorate while parties addressed disagreements regarding the exchange, and during that time a car bomb struck the convoy originating in Fu'ah and Kafraya, killing at least 125 people and injuring 413. No party or group has claimed responsibility for this terrorist attack. First responders, including the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and some 15 Syrian NGOs

and local health authorities, provided care and transferred 275 injured persons to hospitals across Idlib. Some 30 of these cases were referred for treatment in Turkey. Another 138 patients were referred for treatment in Aleppo.

6. Despite the attack, the 15 April evacuation proceeded, with approximately 5,000 persons evacuated from Fu'ah and Kafraya to a transit point at the Mahaliq shelter in Jibreel, Aleppo governorate, and 2,350 persons evacuated from Madaya and Zabadani to Idlib. On 19 April, another evacuation was concluded, involving 3,000 additional persons evacuated from Fu'ah and Kafraya in return for the evacuation of more than 550 fighters and their family members from Zabadani, Madaya, Wadi Barada, Sirghaya and neighbouring areas. While the United Nations has not been involved in the negotiations, agreement or evacuations, it did provide humanitarian assistance, including food and non-food items such as mattresses, through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to those who were evacuated from Fu'ah and Kafraya to the transit point at the Mahaliq shelter and to final destination areas in Rif Dimashq, Homs, Tartus and Ladhqiya. For those evacuating from Madaya and Zabadani, humanitarian partners set up reception centres in Idlib city and Ma'arratmisrin.

7. Evacuations from the Wa'r neighbourhood of the city of Homs subsequent to the 13 March local agreement between the Government and non-State armed opposition groups continued throughout the month, with five evacuations taking place on 1, 8, 18, 24 and 30 April respectively. If the first two rounds of evacuation on 13 and 27 March are included, a total of 10,254 people were evacuated as part of the agreement by the end of April. All evacuations are expected to be completed by mid-May. All but two of the evacuations have been to the Jarabulus district of Aleppo, with the others going to Idlib. Access into the Jarabulus area by humanitarian partners remains limited. Concerns have been reported regarding the conditions in the Zaghra internally displaced persons camp, where most evacuees are staying, and access to the camp remains restricted.


8. On 25 April, reports of air strikes south of Malikiyah town, in Hasakah governorate, which has a significant NGO presence, including a large number of aid workers, were reported. As a result of the air strikes, some NGOs operating in the area temporarily suspended their activities. Shelling across the border between the Turkish military and non-State armed opposition groups was also reported in Afrin, Aleppo governorate, on 26 and 27 April, and in Ra's al-Ayn, Hasakah governorate, on 27 April. The shelling reportedly hit a grain silo and a water station south of Ra's al-Ayn town. While there were no civilian casualties, hundreds of people were reportedly displaced as a result.

9. From 19 April onwards, increased displacement in Raqqah governorate was reported, as the People's Protection Units-led Syrian Democratic Forces advanced to within 20 kilometres of ISIL-held Raqqah city. The total number of persons internally displaced from the area in April was 66,275, including approximately 39,000 displaced to the Jubb al-Sha'ir area on 24 April. As such, the total number of people who have been displaced since the beginning of the Syrian Democratic Forces's Operation Euphrates Wrath exceeds 120,000 people. Freedom of movement of internally displaced persons remains a concern with regards to the ongoing displacement in Raqqah, due to the security screening and sponsorship requirement imposed by the People's Protection Units-led Syrian Democratic Forces for those displaced to remain in the area. Health issues have also been a serious concern at internally displaced person sites, with reports of eight infant deaths at the Karamah site, 20 kilometres east of Raqqah city, where some 80,000 internally displaced persons currently live. The United Nations has also received reports of the death of two children due to a lack of medical care in the Jubb al-Sha'ir area. Shelter was

also reported to be a serious issue at the sites, as a majority of the 35,000 reported to be in camps south-east of Ayn Isa are reportedly staying in open areas.

Figure 1

Key dates in April 2017



Box 2

Brussels conference

(1) The Brussels conference on the Syrian Arab Republic and the region successfully concluded on 5 April, with strong expressions of international commitment to continue to respond to the Syrian conflict. Overall, the conference prominently reinforced calls for unconditional support for ongoing humanitarian and resilience-building activities.

(2) In this regard, participants at the conference highlighted the need for the United Nations to complement the focus on humanitarian priorities with an emphasis on strengthening resilience in order to assure a more sustainable international response to the conflict. The Prime Ministers of Jordan and Lebanon highlighted the need for international support to shift towards supporting long-term development, growth and jobs as a basis for effectively managing the ramifications of the Syrian conflict in neighbouring countries. The conference co-chairs also agreed on the necessity of persistent follow-up to the target, set in London, of 1.1 million jobs for the region. Furthermore, participants agreed to continue to work towards the target of ensuring "No Lost Generation" of children in the Syrian Arab Republic and the region and to increase efforts to reach the goal of ascertaining that all refugee children and vulnerable children in host communities enjoy a quality education, with equal access for boys and girls.

(3) Over 40 donor Governments pledged a combined \$6 billion for humanitarian and resilience-building support for both the Syrian Arab Republic and the region for 2017, with an additional \$3.7 billion for 2018. The United Nations-coordinated response plans for the Syrian Arab Republic and the region, combined, require \$8 billion for 2017 alone.

10. On 23 April, the last informal access route connecting eastern Ghutah with the Qabun district in Damascus was reportedly closed. The result was an immediate spike in commodity prices such as sugar, rice and baby formula. On 28 and 29 April, fighting in eastern Ghuta, including the areas of Irbin, Kafr Batna and Hazzah, between non-State armed opposition groups and the Levant Liberation Organization, an alliance which includes Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly known as Nusra Front), reportedly killed more than 120 people.

11. On 27 April, air strikes reportedly carried out by Israel targeted an arms supply warehouse allegedly operated by Hizbullah near the Damascus international airport.

12. Members of the International Syria Support Group continued their efforts to strengthen the ceasefire across the Syrian Arab Republic. In the framework of the Astana talks, the Islamic Republic of Iran convened an experts' meeting of the three guarantor States, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey, in Tehran on 18 and 19 April. Technical discussions among the three guarantor States and with a delegation of experts from the United Nations that joined the trilateral meetings as observers tackled the ceasefire regime and its implementation, as well as confidence-building measures, including the release of detainees/abductees and the identification of missing persons. A high-level meeting was called for, to be held in Astana on 3 and 4 May.

Protection

13. Air and ground-based strikes continued to kill and injure civilians in significant numbers. As in the past, the high level of civilian casualties continued to raise questions as to whether the principle of distinction and the prohibition on directing attacks against civilians, as well as the prohibition on the launching of indiscriminate attacks and the principles of proportionality and precaution in and against the effects of attacks were respected. Continued attacks resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties — such as those involving the use of toxic agents or the detonation of explosives in the middle of gatherings — put civilians at grave risk, fuelling calls for further violence and pushing the parties to the conflict and supporting States away from seeking a peaceful solution. Children have been particularly affected by the fighting and, in some incidents, constituted the majority of the casualties.

14. The fighting continued to affect civilian infrastructure, including medical personnel and facilities, schools, markets and places of worship. Based on information received by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), civilian casualties in possible violation of international humanitarian law occurred in various governorates (see annex). OHCHR documented alleged incidents by many parties to the conflict, including Government forces and their allies, non-State armed opposition groups and groups designated as terrorist groups by the Security Council.

15. The United States Department of Defense publicly confirmed that in April, the United States-led coalition carried out 549 strikes against ISIL targets in the governorates of Hasakah, Dayr al-Zawr, Homs and Raqqah. Approximately two thirds of those strikes were reported to have been in Raqqah governorate, and nearly a third in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.

16. The Russian Federation continued to provide air support for Syrian Government forces and their allies, as confirmed by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in a briefing on 11 April, in which it stated that Russian Aerospace Defence Forces were continuing to provide support to the Syrian army and militia detachments in their fight against ISIL and the Levant Liberation Organization.

17. Although Operation Euphrates Shield was officially declared complete at the end of March 2017, Turkish air and ground forces continued to support non-State armed opposition groups fighting under the Free Syrian Army banner in operations against ISIL, with the reported aim of improving security and eliminating threats along Turkey's border with the Syrian Arab Republic.

18. The United Nations and health partners received credible reports of 30 attacks that affected medical facilities and personnel throughout the month of April. Of these, 21 have been verified to date. Of the verified attacks, 13 involved hospitals, 3 involved primary health-care centres, 3 were attacks on health workers and 2 were attacks on medical points. All facilities went out of service either permanently or temporarily. For example, on 22 April, air strikes in the area of Abdin, Idlib governorate, hit an underground field hospital and reportedly killed four civilians. On 25 April, the Shahid Wasim Husainu hospital in Kafr Takharim city, Idlib governorate, was hit by air strikes, putting it out of service. On 27 April, a surgical specialty hospital in Dayr al-Sharqi, Idlib governorate, was attacked by four air strikes, which resulted in the deaths of three patients and the wounding of three medical personnel. The hospital was heavily damaged and put out of service as a result of the attack. The next day, on 28 April, the Kafr Takharim Women's Hospital, a maternity hospital in Idlib governorate, was damaged by two air strikes. Patients and staff were evacuated to a basement, with no reports of casualties. Medics reported that windows were blown in and a hospital laboratory badly damaged. The hospital serves 2,100 women and children and performs about 550 deliveries each month. In addition, it provides incubator support for premature babies. The closest hospital providing similar services is 43 miles away.

19. Educational facilities continued to be affected as well. The United Nations received credible information of the following attacks to education facilities and related protected personnel. On 1 April, Qunaytirat School, in Qunaytirat village, Aleppo governorate, was targeted with artillery shelling. On 22 April, Hanbushiyeh School, Hambushiyah town, Idlib governorate, was struck by artillery shelling. No casualties were reported. The school was closed after the incident.

Humanitarian access

Box 3

Key points

- (1) The United Nations estimates that, as of the end of April, some 624,500 people were living under siege in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Barza and Qabun areas of Damascus were added to the list, while Khan al-Shih and Zabadani were removed. Population estimates and locations were adjusted to reflect evacuation processes. Furthermore, the United Nations estimated that some 3.9 million people were in hard-to-reach areas.
- (2) No besieged area was reached through United Nations inter-agency cross-line operations in April, except Dayr al-Zawr (through airdrops). Three inter-agency convoys were deployed in April to hard-to-reach areas: two to northern rural Homs and one to Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham in Damascus. The removal of medical supplies from convoys remains a major challenge, with supplies sufficient for 37,000 people removed in April.
- (3) As of the end of April, the United Nations had reached some 192,000 people under the April/May convoy plan. Other inter-agency convoys could not proceed due to lack of approvals, including the lack of facilitation letters by the Syrian authorities; fighting and insecurity; and other restrictions after initial approvals.
- (4) During the reporting period, some 1,871,000 beneficiaries were assisted by the United Nations and partners via cross-border operations from Turkey and Jordan.

(5) The United Nations and partners continue to respond to the humanitarian impact of fighting and insecurity in Raqqah and north-eastern Syria. While they are reaching hundreds of thousands in these governorates, restrictions by local authorities on the ground are hindering response efforts, as are the difficulties in getting supplies to the area.

20. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need remained extremely challenging in many areas of the country as a result of active conflict, shifting conflict lines, administrative impediments and deliberate restrictions on the movement of people and goods by the parties to the conflict.

21. Following a comprehensive review by the United Nations, it was estimated that, as of the end of April 2017, some 624,500 people were living in 13 areas under siege. Two locations were added to the list: the Barza and Qabun areas of Damascus, following a sustained period of encirclement by Government forces and a severe tightening of restrictions. Two locations were removed from the previous list: Khan al-Shih in Rif Dimashq, following the implementation of a local agreement that improved access in and out of the area; and Zabadani in Rif Dimashq, where evacuations as a result of an agreement rendered the area empty of a population. Furthermore, population figures were adjusted for other locations on the basis of the most recent and most accurate information received from the ground. This included reductions for Wa'r, Madaya, Fu'ah and Kafraya as a result of evacuations that took place over the weeks preceding the publication of the present report. In addition to besieged locations, some 3.9 million people were in hard-to-reach locations.

List of besieged areas, April 2017

<i>Governorate</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Estimated population (as of end April 2017)</i>	<i>Besieged by</i>
Dayr al-Zawr	Dayr al-Zawr	93 500	ISIL
Damascus	Yarmouk	9 800	Government forces and non-State armed opposition groups
Idlib	Fu'ah	12 100	Non-State armed opposition groups
	Kafraya		Non-State armed opposition groups
Rif Dimashq	Qabun and Barzah al-Balad	30 000	Government forces
	Madaya/Buqayn	43 300	Government forces
	Duma area (Duma, Shaffuniyah, Hawsh al-Dawahirah)	150 100	Government forces
	Harasta area (Harasta, Mudayra, Misraba)	46 300	Government forces
	Irbid and surrounding area (Irbid, Zamalka and Jawbar)	49 300	Government forces
	Kafr Batna area (Kafr Batna, Ayn Tarma, Hammurah, Jisrayn, Saqba, Afris, Hazzah, Hawsh al-Ash'ari, Bayt Siwa, Muhammadiyah)	132 400	Government forces
	Nashabiyah area (Nashabiyah, Beyt Nayim, Salhiyah, Utaya, Hazrama)	16 500	Government forces
Homs	Wa'r	41 200	Government forces
Total		624 500	

22. Access by the United Nations to those living in besieged and hard-to-reach locations remains a critical concern. Three inter-agency convoys were dispatched to besieged and hard-to-reach locations during April. This included the hard-to-reach areas of Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham; Hulah and Harbinafsih; and Dar al-Kabirah, Ghantu and Tarmala. Convoys to other besieged and hard-to-reach areas, including those approved under the April-May inter-agency convoy plan, were unable to proceed as a result of fighting and insecurity, administrative delays by the Syrian authorities and restrictions applied by non-State armed opposition groups.

23. During the reporting period, United Nations agencies also undertook single-agency deliveries to cross-line and hard-to-reach locations or reached those locations through their regular programmes. United Nations agencies encountered difficulties in accessing some locations. For example, despite obtaining the necessary approvals from the respective Government authorities, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was not allowed to enter Yalda with a humanitarian convoy as planned for the month of April, even though an inter-agency convoy was able to reach the area. UNRWA has not been able to reach Yarmouk since May 2016. Meanwhile, NGOs — both international and Syrian — continued to provide medical, education, psychosocial and protection services, as well as some support in related sectors, in hard-to-reach locations, under extremely challenging circumstances.

24. Throughout the period, additional humanitarian actors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, responded in besieged and hard-to-reach areas, in accordance with humanitarian principles.

Figure II

United Nations inter-agency cross-line humanitarian operations: percentage of people reached each month in besieged areas, including via airdrops to Dayr al-Zawr city



25. A combination of insecurity, deliberate interference and restrictions by the parties to the conflict continued to prevent aid delivery. For example, the majority of United Nations agencies and the majority of its partners continue to be unable to access populations in need in ISIL-controlled areas of the country, as all plans to deliver assistance to these areas have been suspended due to the inability to work independently and monitor activities. This is preventing the United Nations and its humanitarian partners from reaching Raqqah city and most of the Dayr al-Zawr

governorates, as well as pockets of northern rural Aleppo, southern rural Hasakah and north-western rural Hama.

26. Meanwhile, restrictions continue to be imposed by non-State armed opposition groups and other local actors. For example, humanitarian organizations have reported challenges in obtaining approvals from local authorities in Kurdish-controlled areas of north-eastern Syrian Arab Republic, causing delays to programming. In this regard, since 5 April, the Kurdish self-administration has suspended all regular programming activities by the United Nations and international NGOs in Hasakah governorate. The suspensions were preceded by a self-administration request to redirect all supplies from the regular programme to support the response in Raqqah governorate.

27. At the same time, humanitarian access for Turkey-based cross-border partners into Idlib governorate is also reportedly facing more challenges, as non-State armed opposition groups and groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist groups are placing demands on NGOs operating in the governorate. NGOs are being informed of new registration requirements and/or told to provide information on staffing, logistics and finances. Those demands are not being applied consistently and have led some NGOs to scale down or even temporarily suspend their operations, pending a resolution of those issues.

28. In April, after four years of closure, the road between Aleppo and Qamishli was reopened for commercial traffic, following an agreement between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and parties on the ground. However, humanitarian actors are still awaiting formal approvals from the Syrian authorities to use the road, which would significantly improve access and the supply of life-saving items.

Table 1

United Nations inter-agency cross-line humanitarian operations, April 2017

 192,100 people reached

		
People reached in hard-to-reach areas 157,500	People reached in besieged areas 34,600	People reached in priority cross-line areas 0
4.0 per cent People reached in hard-to-reach areas	5.4 per cent People reached in besieged areas	1 of 13 Besieged locations reached
		
Cross-line convoys 3	Airlifts 41	Airdrops 16

29. Life-saving and life-sustaining medical items sufficient for over 37,000 treatments were removed from convoys in April. The treatments and supplies removed are shown in table 2. Serum drugs, renewable items (razors, scalpel blades and gauze) and items considered as surgical equipment (forceps, scissors and needles) were consistently removed by Government security bodies from midwifery kits, inter-agency emergency health kits, paediatric kits and diarrhoeal disease sets, in inter-agency and single agency convoys, thus hampering their functionality and causing severe deprivation to the beneficiaries. Additional medical supplies were scheduled to be delivered as part of the monthly inter-agency convoy plan, but all but three of the convoys were unable to proceed. Furthermore, since the beginning of 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO) has submitted seven single-agency requests to the Syrian Government to access 14 locations in five governorates. The Syrian Government approved two requests, while five requests remain unanswered.

Table 2

Medical supplies removed from humanitarian convoys, April 2017

<i>Location</i>	<i>Number of treatments</i>	<i>Type of supplies</i>
Yalda, Babila, Bayt Saham	5 800	Inter-agency emergency health kit, pneumonia type A and B kits
Hulah and Harbinafsil	27 111	Antibiotics, vascular medicine, digestive medicine, pneumonia type A and B kits, asthma medicine, antispasmodics
Dar al-Kabirah, Ghantu, and Tarmala	4 795	Atropine, analgesic, cardiac drugs, mental health drugs, syringes, needles and polyvidone were entirely rejected from the approved quantities as well as pneumonia type B kits

30. The United Nations inter-agency convoy plan for April-May requested access to 28 locations, including besieged locations, aiming to reach 1,066,650 people. A total of 764,950 of the 1,066,650 requested beneficiaries (71.7 per cent) were approved; nine locations were approved in full, while 13 locations were approved with conditions on how many people in need would be permitted to be reached in those locations. Six locations comprising over 132,000 people were denied. As of the end of April, the team had reached some 157,500 people with three convoys. Convoys to other approved locations in the plan could not be dispatched in April due to non-approval by the Syrian authorities at the outset; insecurity and fighting; and delays with the issuance of facilitation letters in some instances.

31. Individual agencies continued to submit requests for single-agency convoys during the reporting period. For example, during the month of April, the World Food Programme (WFP) submitted 1,698 official requests to obtain facilitation letters to transport food assistance to targeted locations across the country, the vast majority of which were for regularly accessible areas. Of these, eight requests did not receive approval or response from the relevant authorities, preventing the delivery of food assistance for 30,000 people in Homs, Dar'a and Rif Dimashq governorates. UNHCR submitted 45 facilitation letters for the movement of non-food items and livelihood kits within the Syrian Arab Republic, mostly to areas accessible under regular programming. All were approved.

32. The Nusaybin/Qamishli crossing in Hasakah governorate has been temporarily closed by the Turkish authorities since 27 December 2015 because of security concerns. This has interrupted land deliveries of United Nations humanitarian assistance to Hasakah governorate through borders surrounding the governorate.

Hasakah governorate also remains largely inaccessible by road for United Nations agencies from within the Syrian Arab Republic due to insecurity and the presence of ISIL along the routes. However, the road from Aleppo through Manbij to Hasakah has reopened for commercial traffic. While discussions continue to seek to identify a land route for life-saving United Nations aid, the United Nations continues with airlifts from Damascus to Qamishli airport to deliver multisectoral assistance.

Humanitarian response

33. In April, United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners continued to reach millions of people in need through all modalities from within the Syrian Arab Republic and across its borders (see table 3). In addition to the United Nations and partners, NGOs continued to deliver life-saving assistance to people in need, in line with previous months. The Government continued to provide basic services to those areas under its control and in many areas beyond its control. Local authorities in many areas controlled by non-State armed opposition groups also continued to provide services when possible.


Table 3

Number of people reached by the United Nations and other organizations, April 2017

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Number of people reached</i>
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	243 198
International Organization for Migration	
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	297 046
United Nations Children's Fund	>1 500 000
United Nations Development Programme	1 811 402
United Nations Population Fund	190 807
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	418 000
World Food Programme	3 760 000
World Health Organization	1 561 851

34. During the reporting period cross-border deliveries continued from Turkey and Jordan into the Syrian Arab Republic under the terms of resolutions 2165 (2014) 2191 (2014) 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) (see figure III for details). In line with these resolutions the United Nations notified the Syrian authorities in advance of each shipment including with respect to the content destination and number of beneficiaries of the shipments. The United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic continued its operations monitoring 470 trucks used in 20 convoys by 7 United Nations agencies in April confirming the humanitarian nature of each and notifying the Syrian authorities after each shipment. The Mechanism continued to benefit from excellent cooperation with the Governments of Jordan and Turkey.

Figure III
Number of beneficiaries assisted by the United Nations and its partners per cluster through cross-border humanitarian deliveries, April 2017
(Thousands)



35. Inter-agency convoys completed in April 2017 are listed in table 4 below. In total, the United Nations undertook three inter-agency convoys during the reporting month, all part of the April-May inter-agency convoy plan. In April, the logistics cluster on behalf of United Nations agencies completed 16 airdrop rotations to besieged Dayr al-Zawr city, airdropping food rations for some 34,600 people. In April, 41 airlift rotations to Qamishli were completed, airlifting a total of 1,516 metric tons of WFP food and other supplies on behalf of other humanitarian actors. This enabled WFP to provide food assistance for 207,000 people in parts of Hasakah, Raqqah, Aleppo and Dayr al-Zawr governorates, including nearly 130,000 people displaced as a result of ongoing fighting in Raqqah governorate.

Table 4
Inter-agency cross-line humanitarian convoys, April 2017

Date	Location	Requested target (number of beneficiaries)	Targeted people reached	Type of assistance
8 April	Yalda, Babila, and Bayt Saham	35 000	35 000	Multisectoral
13 April	Hulah and Harbinafsih	89 000	89 000	Multisectoral
20 April	Dar al-Kabirah, Ghantu and Tarmala	33 500	33 500	Multisectoral

36. While not involved in the evacuation processes, the United Nations and its partners have been assisting civilians in need who have been evacuated from the besieged locations of the Four Towns (Fu'ah, Kafraya, Madaya and Zabadani) and Wa'r. In April, the United Nations and partners visited evacuation centres in rural Homs, Aleppo, Tartus and Ladhikiyah hosting evacuees from Fu'ah and Kafraya and provided follow-up assistance. Meanwhile, cross-border partners have been responding to those who arrived in Idlib and rural Aleppo from Madaya, Zabadani and Wa'r.

37. The United Nations and partners have continued to respond to the humanitarian impact of fighting in Raqqah governorate. During April, some 221,600 people were reached with food in Raqqah, while over 1,000 tents and other shelter support were set up in various internally displaced person camps and transit sites. Furthermore, up to 1,000 cubic metres of potable water were supplied on a daily basis across various camps and transit sites, while basic relief items, primary health-

care activities, vaccinations and nutritional and educational support continued to be provided by both partners based in the Syrian Arab Republic and cross-border partners. Furthermore, the United Nations and partners launched protection services in camps and transit sites amid concerns related to restrictions on the freedom of movement of internally displaced persons during security screening processes (at checkpoints, assembly points and transit sites).

38. A national polio campaign, supported by WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was conducted from 18 to 27 April. Preliminary results indicate that more than 2.4 million children under five years of age were vaccinated, compared to a target of 2.7 million. The campaign was conducted in all governorates except in parts of Raqqah and Idlib. The polio campaign was suspended in Tall Abyad due to a disagreement with the local authorities. Vaccination activities in rural Dayr al-Zawr were limited to health centres only, as ISIL refused the participation of mobile teams. Vaccines were delivered to East Ghutah in coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

39. During April, UNICEF provided nutrition services for almost 250,000 children and pregnant and lactating mothers through regular programming and cross-border and inter-agency cross-line operations. Nutrition services included preventive, therapeutic and supplementary interventions, including screening and treatment for cases of moderate and severe acute malnutrition. Around 33,500 children and mothers were reached in hard-to-reach locations.

40. On 9 and 10 April, UNRWA teams organized two successful missions to Khan al-Shih to conduct a multisectoral assessment of the services provided to Palestine refugees, including damage to United Nations installations, and to identify the overall needs of the refugees remaining in the area. The teams reported serious damage to UNRWA installations. Two schools and one community-based centre were completely destroyed or damaged, while two schools, one health centre, one sanitation office and one Engaging Youth centre needed further rehabilitation.

41. UNHCR, in conjunction with partners, continued to manage 75 functioning community centres across 11 governorates. Community centres are designed as one-stop-shops, at which a wide range of protection services and livelihood support, income generation, vocational training and life skills development are provided to internally displaced persons and host communities. In April, some 16,000 displaced persons received support through these centres.

42. Throughout the month, the Russian Federation sent to the United Nations information bulletins from the Russian Centre for the reconciliation of opposing sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, which outlined the provision of bilateral relief assistance. Other Member States also continued to provide bilateral and other forms of humanitarian assistance.

Visas and registrations

43. A total of 57 new visa requests were submitted to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in April. Of these, 30 applications were approved, 2 were rejected and 25 remain pending. Five new visa requests submitted in earlier months were approved in April, while three were rejected. A total of 49 visa renewal requests were submitted in April. A further 29 visa renewals submitted in earlier months were also approved, while 2 remain pending.

44. A total of 17 international NGOs are registered with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to operate in the country. Four international NGOs are in the process of completing registration. Those organizations continued to face a series of administrative hurdles and restrictions that affect their ability to operate, including

in gaining permission to undertake independent needs assessments. Some 217 national NGOs are authorized by the Syrian Arab Republic to partner with the United Nations. One additional national NGO received such authorization during April.

Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and premises

45. In addition to the attacks on health facilities mentioned earlier, in early April, two distribution points for food and basic relief items in the Maydan neighbourhood of Damascus were temporarily closed due to a spike in mortar attacks.

46. On 30 April, due to the deteriorating security situation in Hasakah, humanitarian missions to Naruz, Ar Ruj, Mabrukah and Ayn Isa camps were cancelled.

47. Since the start of the conflict, dozens of humanitarian workers have been killed, including 21 staff members of the United Nations — of which 17 were UNRWA staff members — 65 staff members and volunteers of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and eight staff members and volunteers of the Palestine Red Crescent Society. In addition, many staff members of international and national NGOs are reported to have been killed. A total of 29 United Nations staff, including one UNDP staff and 28 UNRWA staff, are detained or currently missing. In addition to the detained and missing, two United Nations staff have been conscripted for military service since 1 January, this despite United Nations officials being exempt from military service according to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946.

III. Observations

48. Over the past six months, owing to military advances and local agreements that profoundly affect the lives of vulnerable civilians, there have been significant changes to the front lines in the Syrian Arab Republic. This has led to some benefits, as civilians who had previously been under the control of ISIL are now accessible and can be provided with humanitarian assistance. However, for many hundreds of thousands, life continues as before, under conditions that are difficult to fathom.

49. Although the number of people in besieged areas has been reduced by about 20,000, to 624,500, in 13 areas, this does not represent an increase in the protection of civilians. In many instances, the end of sieges followed prolonged periods of heavy fighting and restricted humanitarian assistance. Tens of thousands of people also leave besieged areas after local agreements are reached. Such local agreements do not appear to meet international standards or humanitarian safeguards and may, in some circumstances, be characterized as forced population transfers to opposition-controlled areas, in which civilian infrastructure continues to be attacked regularly.

50. There were 30 credible reports of attacks on hospitals and medical facilities in April alone, including 21 confirmed reports. This is an indicator of the unacceptable conditions in which a large portion of the Syrian population continues to live. With the reported chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April and the continued attacks against education facilities, markets and places of worship, the ongoing protection crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is without comparison in recent history. I continue to reiterate my call for the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to be referred to the International Criminal Court, and I call on all Member States to support the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the

Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

51. The United Nations has the ability to deliver assistance to 350,000 people each week with inter-agency cross-line convoys. It would be possible to reach all those in besieged areas every month, if only access were fully allowed and facilitated. However, the United Nations capacity to deliver is deliberately underutilized week after week. Restrictions by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in allowing aid to reach those most in need, despite having a two-month access plan and agreements to deliver from authorities in principle, continue to result in only a trickle of cross-line convoys each month, which is simply not enough to stem the acute suffering. Restrictions have been growing in other areas as well, as areas controlled by non-State armed opposition groups in Idlib and the north-east of the country have increasingly constrained access. The international community must do better to reach those in need, and I call upon the members of the Security Council and the members of the International Syria Support Group to individually and collectively use their influence to improve humanitarian access in order to prevent the situation from growing even worse.

52. In Brussels, I noted the need to send a strong, constant message to the Syrian people that theirs will not be a forgotten war. It is for the sake of ordinary Syrians that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations will continue. Nothing is more important or more urgent than ending this conflict without further delay. The suffering of the Syrian people will end only when a political solution can be achieved. The United Nations process in Geneva, building on advances on the Astana track of talks, remains the primary avenue for the attainment of a political settlement between Syrians within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012. I remain committed to achieving progress within this framework.

Annex

Incidents affecting civilians recorded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, April 2017^a

Rif Dimashq and Damascus governorates

- On 3 April, around 10.30 a.m., air strikes hit a residential area in opposition-controlled Saqba, reportedly resulting in the death of five civilians, including one woman.
- On 3 April, also around 10.30 a.m., air strikes hit a residential area in Hamuriyah, reportedly resulting in the death of three civilians.
- On 3 April, around 2 p.m., a medical centre in the opposition-held city of Jisrayn was reportedly hit by air strikes and partly damaged.
- On 3 April, around 5 p.m., air strikes hit a residential area in the opposition-held part of the city of Duma, reportedly resulting in 22 civilian casualties, including three children and two women. At least 50 civilians were also reportedly injured in the attack, including 10 children and eight women.
- On 4 April, at noon, air strikes hit a five-storey building located in a residential area of Saqba, causing its collapse and reportedly killing 10 civilians, including a pregnant woman, while injuring an undetermined number of others.
- On 4 April, around 5 p.m., air strikes hit the Jawz residential area in Saqba, reportedly resulting in the death of eight civilians, including two women and two children.
- On 4 April, around 5 p.m., air strikes hit a residential area in Hamuriyah, reportedly killing seven civilians, including four children (one girl and three boys).
- On 4 April in the afternoon, air strikes on a residential area of Duma reportedly resulted in the death of two civilians.
- On 4 April, air strikes on a residential area in Kafr Batna reportedly resulted in the death of two civilians.
- On 17 April, a ground-based strike hit a residential area of opposition-held Duma, reportedly killing a child.
- On 21 April, air strikes conducted between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. on the city of Duma reportedly resulted in the death of two civilians in residential areas and of two civilians in agricultural areas surrounding the city.
- On 26 April, a ground-based strike hit the residential Abu Rummanah area in Government-controlled Damascus, allegedly resulting in the death of two women.

^a In line with resolution 2258 (2015), the present description of developments on the ground, and the incidents during the month that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has been able to corroborate, relates to compliance with resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. The information is provided without prejudice to the work of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group. The reporting is not a comprehensive listing of all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of international human rights law that took place in the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period.

- On 16 April, a mine exploded in the southern outskirts of Madaya, reportedly killing a child and injuring five others.

Dar'a governorate

- On 1 April, two children were reportedly killed in a landmine explosion in the opposition-held town of Da'il.
- On 3 April, air strikes launched around 9.15 p.m. on the area of Dar'a al-Balad allegedly killed a civilian as he was reportedly working on electrical repairs.
- On 4 April, around 1 a.m., air strikes hit a residential area of the opposition-held town of Simlin, reportedly killing four members of a displaced family from Lakhul.
- On 6 April, around 10.30 p.m., air strikes hit the opposition-held neighbourhood of Tariq al-Sadd in Dar'a, allegedly killing a family of five: a pregnant woman, her husband and their three children — two boys and a girl.
- On 8 April, air strikes hit the opposition-controlled area of Nasib, located on the Jordanian border, reportedly killing three children (including a girl) and wounding an undetermined number of other civilians, primarily women and children.
- On 9 April, at 1.30 a.m., a hospital in Da'il was hit by air strikes, which reportedly resulted in the killing of a male nurse and injury to three other civilians, including two female nurses. The hospital was damaged.
- On 11 April, a civilian was killed when ground-based strikes hit the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army-controlled town of Tasil.
- On 14 April, an aid worker was allegedly killed in an air strike that hit the opposition-controlled area of Dar'a al-Mahattah in Dar'a city.
- On 26 April, around 1 a.m., air strikes hit a residential area of Simlin and reportedly killed a family of four, including a boy and a girl, and injured an undetermined number of civilians.
- On 28 April, Khalid ibn al-Walid Army fighters reportedly summarily executed eight civilians in Tasil, allegedly due to their affiliation with other armed opposition groups.
- On 29 April, Khalid ibn al-Walid Army allegedly publicly decapitated a civilian in Tasil after they accused him of "sorcery".
- On 30 April, air strikes hit residential areas in Dar'a al-Balad and reportedly killed nine civilians, including two women and three children (one boy and two girls), and injured an undetermined number of civilians.
- On 30 April, air strikes hit a residential area in the city of Busra al-Hariri, reportedly causing the death of two civilians, including the head of the Busra al-Hariri local council.
- On 30 April, air strikes on a residential area in Na'imah allegedly killed a civilian woman and her five-year-old child.

Aleppo governorate

- On 1 April, air strikes hit the building of the Radwan humanitarian association, located in Urum al-Kubra town, in western central Aleppo, allegedly killing four children and injuring three civilians.

- On 3 April, ground-based strikes hit residential areas in the village of Yaqid al-Adas, in northern rural Aleppo, and allegedly killed five civilians, including three children.
- On 8 April, at dawn, air strikes hit residential areas in the opposition-held town of Darat Izzah, in western rural Aleppo, reportedly killing a mother and her child and injuring at least seven other civilians.
- On 22 April, a woman and her two children were allegedly killed when air strikes hit residential areas of Darat Izzah town in western rural Aleppo.
- On 27 April in the morning, air strikes hit residential areas of Kafr Naha town in western rural Aleppo and allegedly killed two civilians while injuring nine others, including seven children and two women.

Idlib governorate

- On 2 April, air strikes hit the opposition-held city of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, reportedly injuring an undetermined number of civilians, causing extensive destruction and putting the city's main hospital out of service.
- On 3 April, air strikes hit residential areas in Habit town in the Khan Shaykhun district, reportedly killing two children and injuring 20 other civilians.
- On 3 April, air strikes hit the city of Khan Shaykhun, reportedly killing three male civilians.
- On 4 April, at around 7 a.m., air strikes hit residential areas of the Furn neighbourhood located in the north of Khan Shaykhun city, reportedly killing 90 civilians, including 28 children and 20 women, after apparent exposure to toxic agents. Five on-duty civil defence members and three journalists were injured while covering the attack. At approximately 1 p.m., the main hospital of Khan Shaykhun, which had received those injured in the earlier attack, was hit, as was the adjacent civil defence centre. The strikes reportedly caused some material damage to the facilities. In a statement issued the same day, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons raised serious concerns about the alleged use of chemical weapons and indicated that it was investigating the incident.
- On 4 April, air strikes hit a residential area in opposition-held Salqin, north-east of Idlib, allegedly killing at least 26 civilians, including 14 children and six women. Most of the victims were reportedly internally displaced persons from Aleppo and Dayr al-Zawr.
- On 4 April, air strikes hit residential areas in Saraqib city, reportedly killing a civilian woman and her three children.
- In the afternoon of 4 April, air strikes hit residential areas in the al-Sina'ah neighbourhood of Jisr al-Shughur, reportedly killing seven civilians, including a child, and injuring an undetermined number of civilians.
- On 5 April, ground-based strikes hit the besieged town of Al-Fu'ah, reportedly injuring three civilians, including one woman and a six-year-old child.
- On 6 April, ground-based strikes reportedly hit Al-Fu'ah, allegedly injuring four civilians, including three children.
- On 6 April, air strikes hit residential areas in the village of Zahiriya near Ariha, reportedly killing two girls who were sisters.

- On 6 April, a civilian was reportedly killed by elements of the Levant Liberation Organization (which includes the group formerly known as Nusrah Front) in Khan al-Sabal in Ma'arrat al-Nu'man.
- On 7 April, air strikes hit residential areas in the town of Haysh, located near Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, reportedly killing three male civilians and injuring an undetermined number of others.
- On 7 April, air strikes hit western parts of Jisr al-Shughur city, reportedly killing two civil defence members and injuring two others.
- On 7 April, ground-based strikes reportedly hit Fu'ah, allegedly killing a 14-year-old boy.
- On 8 April, air strikes hit shops and houses along the main avenue of Urum al-Jawz city in Ariha, reportedly killing 20 civilians, including seven children and one woman, and injuring at least 20 others.
- On 8 April, several air strikes were reported to have hit the town of Haysh, allegedly damaging a medical facility in the vicinity.
- On 8 April, ground-based strikes hit Fu'ah and reportedly injured two male civilians.
- On 9 April, air strikes hit residential areas in the city of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, reportedly killing two male civilians.
- On 11 April, air strikes hit residential areas in Hambushiyah village in Jisr al-Shughur, reportedly killing three civilians, including a child.
- On 17 April, a mother and child hospital in Shinan was hit by air strikes that reportedly injured an undetermined number of civilians in the hospital and damaged the facility, putting it out of service.
- On 18 April, at dawn, air strikes hit a residential area in the city of Ma'arrat Hurmah, reportedly resulting in the deaths of 11 civilians, including nine children (five girls and four boys), and injuring an undetermined number of others.
- On 22 April, four civilians were allegedly killed when an air strike hit the village of Ihsim.
- On 22 April in the afternoon, an underground field hospital located near Abdin was hit by air strikes, and four civilians were killed.
- On 25 April, shortly after midnight, air strikes struck the area of Jabal Duwaylah, south-west of Kafr Takharim city, allegedly killing 15 civilians, including five internally displaced persons.
- On 25 April, around 2 a.m., a hospital in Kafr Takharim city was reportedly hit by air strikes and consequently put out of service. No casualties were reported in the attack.
- On 24 April, around 1.30 p.m., air strikes hit a food market in Khan Shaykhun, allegedly killing seven civilians and wounding an undetermined number of others.
- On 27 April, at dawn, air strikes hit a hospital in the eastern outskirts of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, reportedly resulting in the death of three civilians who were in intensive care, including a woman and a girl. An undetermined number of other civilians, including medical personnel, were reportedly injured in the strike, and the hospital was partly destroyed. The facility was hit again by air strikes later the same day.

- On 27 April, a funeral procession in Ma'arr Shurin town was reportedly hit by air strikes, which allegedly killed seven civilians and injured an undetermined number of others.
- On 27 April, air strikes hit a civil defence centre near the town of Ma'arr Zaytah and started a fire in the facility. Later the same day, the location was hit by further air strikes, which reportedly killed four civil defence members and caused significant material damage, including the destruction of several ambulances.
- On 27 April, air strikes hit a residential area of Sarjah city and reportedly killed a child.
- On 27 April, air strikes hit Khan Shaykhun, reportedly killing eight civilians, including a woman and three children, in addition to wounding an undetermined number of others.

Hama governorate

- On 8 April, an improvised explosive device placed underneath a bus transporting civilians exploded in Zahra' neighbourhood in the Government-controlled city of Homs, reportedly killing five civilians, including four women, and injuring nine others.
- On 29 April, around noon, air strikes hit a medical facility in Kafr Zayta city, reportedly resulting in the death of eight Civil Defence members and in the destruction of the facility. Around 2 p.m., a second air strike hit the same location, reportedly killing two civilians.
- On 29 April, around 9 p.m., another medical centre located in the outskirts of Kafr Zayta was hit by air strikes that reportedly put the facility out of order.

Dayr al-Zawr governorate

- On 3 April, two vehicle borne improvised explosive devices detonated at a Syrian Democratic Forces-controlled checkpoint on al-Mahattah Street in Jazrat al-Buhamid town, located in western rural Deir-ez-Zor. The first one exploded at the checkpoint, and the other detonated 30 minutes later as civilians gathered around the location. As a result, five civilians, including one woman, were allegedly killed and at least 15 others injured, including children.
- On 9 April, two civilians were reportedly killed and at least 17 others injured by ground-based strikes on residential areas in Wadi Street in the Government-controlled Jurah neighbourhood in Dayr al-Zawr city.
- On 13 April, one civilian was allegedly killed and at least two others injured by ground-based fire on the Government-held part of Dayr al-Zawr city.
- On 17 April, a girl was reportedly killed by ground-based fire in the Government-held part of Dayr al-Zawr city.
- On 16 April, ground-based strikes hit residential areas in the Government-controlled Harabish neighbourhood of Dayr al-Zawr city and reportedly killed five civilians and injured nine others.
- On 17 April, at approximately 10 p.m., air strikes hit a residential compound in Albu Kamal city and reportedly killed at least 20 civilians, including nine Iraqi civilians who had recently fled Iraq, and injured at least 30 others. The United States-led coalition stated in its public reporting that, on the same day,

it had conducted a strike that destroyed an ISIL staging area in the vicinity of Albu Kamal.

- On 17 April, air strikes destroyed the building of the former Agriculture College in the town of Husayniyah in north-west rural Dayr al-Zawr. Located in a residential area, the building was being used by ISIL as an office. The air strikes reportedly killed at least 11 civilians, including women and children, and injured an undetermined number of others.
- On 18 April, ground-based strikes hit residential areas in the al-Jurah neighbourhood of Dayr al-Zawr, reportedly killing three civilians, including a girl under the age of 10.

Raqqah governorate

- On 3 April, air strikes hit a house in Hamrat Ghanam village in eastern rural Raqqah, reportedly killing four civilians, including two women, and injuring three others, including two women.
- On 7 April in the afternoon, air strikes hit an Internet cafe and some houses in the village of Hunaydah in western rural Raqqah and reportedly killed at least 13 civilians, including two boys and a woman, and injured 23 others.
- On 8 April, a boat transporting at least 40 civilians fleeing heavy air strikes and ground-based strikes was hit as it was crossing the Euphrates River in the area of Tabaqah. A woman and her six children were allegedly killed in the attack, with the fate of the rest of the passengers unknown. The United States-led coalition stated in its public reporting that it had conducted 10 strikes near Tabaqah on 8 April, engaging 10 ISIL tactical units, destroying two defensive fighting positions and destroying four ISIL vehicles.
- On 22 April, air strikes hit the Al-Hal market area of Tabaqah city and reportedly killed a family (a couple and three children). The United States-led coalition stated in its public reporting that it had conducted eight strikes near Tabaqah on 22 April, engaging six ISIL tactical units and destroying five fighting positions and two improvised explosive devices.
- On 23 April, a civilian woman and her two children were reportedly killed when an improvised explosive device detonated in their vicinity in the Zuwayqat neighbourhood of Tabaqah city.
- On 24 April, air strikes hit a vehicle that was reportedly carrying civilians trying to escape the Tabaqah area. At least eight civilians from one family were allegedly injured, including three women and five children aged between three months and 15 years of age. The United States-led coalition stated in its public reporting that it had conducted seven strikes near Tabaqah on 24 April, engaging three ISIL tactical units, destroying three ISIL command and control nodes, a fighting position and a heavy machine gun and suppressing two ISIL tactical units.
- On 25 April, at approximately 11 p.m., air strikes hit three houses of civilians north of Ajrawi roundabout in the centre of Tabaqah city and reportedly killed 16 civilians, including nine children and five women. The United States-led coalition stated in its public reporting that it had conducted six strikes near Tabaqah on 25 April, engaging four ISIL tactical units and destroying four fighting positions and a fuel truck.



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
Original: English

**Letter dated 23 May 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to attach herewith a copy of a message that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, Ibrahim Ahmed Abd al-Aziz Ghandour, addressed to the Secretary-General (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Magdi Ahmed Mofadal **Elnour**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 23 May 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: Arabic]

I refer to my letter of 27 February 2017, which transmitted a list of violations by armed movements of the unilateral ceasefire declared by the Government of the Sudan and renewed on a number of occasions over the course of a year and a half. I now write to apprise you of a dangerous development and flagrant violation not only of the ceasefire, but also of the most important established principle of the Charter of the United Nations regarding violations of the sovereignty of States and their territory. At a time when our armed forces are exercising the utmost restraint to uphold the ceasefire declared by the President of the Republic, the armed movements have escalated their attacks. They have done so in order to provoke the armed forces and trigger a military response, thereby undermining the ceasefire and destroying the positive momentum that had been achieved since the situation in Darfur became fully stable.

With respect to our western border, since the beginning of May 2017 our specialized agencies have observed military stockpiling activities and the deployment on the western side of the border of rebel forces that had been fighting as mercenaries in Libya. By 8 May 2017, 172 armed vehicles and 12 armoured vehicles were deployed in the area of Rabyanah on the Libyan side of the border. These forces were commanded by the rebel leaders Jabir Ishaq, Salih Jabal and Rajab Jaw. They gradually moved to the area of Bawabat al-Sarah on the border between Libya and the Sudan, and began infiltrating Sudanese territory in groups. The first such group was composed of 50 armed vehicles. They entered Sudanese territory on 17 May 2017, amassing to the east of Bi'r Marqi inside Sudanese borders, then were joined the same day by another 20 armed vehicles. Those forces continued to infiltrate the border on 19 May 2017, when another 35 combat vehicles crossed into the Sudan. On the morning of 20 May 2017, they attacked the front ranks of our armed forces, which were concentrated in the north-eastern part of Bi'r Marqi. The Sudanese armed forces engaged them and defeated them.

With respect to our border with South Sudan, since the beginning of May 2017 our specialized agencies have observed the deployment near the border of 47 armed vehicles belonging to the Minni Arcua Minawi faction commanded by rebel leader Juma Mundi, as well as 49 armed vehicles belonging to the Justice and Equality Movement commanded by rebel leader Sadiq Bungo and another 37 armed vehicles belonging to the Abdul Wahid faction commanded by rebel leader Muhammad Tarradah, bringing the total number of armed vehicles deployed on the border with South Sudan to 133 armed vehicles. Some of these were armoured vehicles and Ural transport trucks carrying weapons and ammunition. On 20 May 2017, 62 armed vehicles crossed the Sudanese border at Sakkara and Shabakat, then took positions in the Ashirayah area, where they clashed with our armed forces in Guz al-Nimayah. Our troops managed to defeat the remnants of the hostile forces and pursue them back over the border.

We hereby bring to your attention this dangerous development, which amounts to a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the military aggression against Sudanese territory and its innocent people. We emphasize that the failure of the international community to take decisive action with respect to these armed movements, even though they have been working as mercenaries in both Libya and South Sudan, has encouraged them to escalate their blatant violations of the ceasefire. The Sudanese Government has repeatedly extended the

ceasefire over the past year and a half in accordance with the requirements of the significant political transition that has been taking place in the country since the adoption of the recommendations of the Sudan National Dialogue and the formation of a government of national accord to implement those recommendations. Furthermore, the five Darfur States have enjoyed security and stability for over two years, as attested by your periodic reports on Darfur, the most recent of which was reviewed by the Security Council on 4 April 2017 (S/2017/250). That point has also been repeatedly confirmed by the visit of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the visit of the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and its Panel of Experts on the Sudan to Darfur, whose reports have noted the improved security and humanitarian situation in the five Darfur States.

In conclusion, the Government of the Sudan maintains its firm and principled position that the door should be open to the leaders of these armed groups to lay down their arms and join the political process without delay. We call on you and the Security Council and the entire international community to condemn these armed movements and hold their leaders accountable for the blatant aggression against the sovereignty and territory of the Sudan, and to condemn those who embrace them or give them financial and logistical support, which impedes development and leads to the killing of defenceless innocents, destruction of infrastructure. We also call on you to press these movements to immediately accede to the calls of the lead African mediator, Thabo Mbeki, to come to the negotiating table and sign the ceasefire declaration, which would lead to a complete and lasting ceasefire and the necessary security arrangements, so that all Sudanese people can reinforce the peace and stability that has been achieved and engage in development and reconstruction.

(Signed) Ibrahim Ahmed **Ghandour**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan